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LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
J. HARDIN MARION*
"You are old, Father William," the young man said.* *
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA or the Act)' in 1967 "to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment."' Among the factors prompting the passage of the
ADEA were the difficulties faced by older workers in trying to retain
their jobs and in finding new employment when displaced, the prev-
alent practice among employers of setting arbitrary age limits unre-
lated to the ability of employees to perform their jobs, and the high
unemployment rate among older workers.'
Remedies for violations of the Act are to have a restorative pur-
pose. Courts are authorized to grant relief "to eliminate the unlaw-
ful practices and to restore aggrieved persons to the positions where
they would have been if the illegal discrimination had not oc-
curred."4 The Act's goal "is to make persons whole for injuries suf-
fered as a result of unlawful employment discrimination." 5 Indeed,
the Act's restorative purpose was recently reaffirmed by the Fourth
Circuit when it held that a court must "grant 'the most complete
relief possible' toward putting the victim of age discrimination back
* B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, Washington & Lee University. Partner, Tydings & Ro-
senberg, Baltimore, Maryland. The genesis of this article was a case, eventually settled,
in which the author was confronted with many of the questions explored here.
** L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 43 (London 1971) (London
1865).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1982).
4. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982). Accord Spa-
gnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 727 F.2d 114, 120 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) ("purpose behind the
equitable relief" is "to put the injured party back into the position he would have been
in but for the discrimination").
5. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982). See also
Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Gibson and para-
phrasing its language); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977) ("The
make whole standard of relief should be the touchstone ... in fashioning ... remedies in
age discrimination cases."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
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into the position he would have been in but for the unlawful
discrimination.
' 6
This general restorative formula, however, is not self-explana-
tory. How is a person restored to the position he would have been
in but for the discrimination? A variety of more specific questions
arise in pursuit of this general aim: What is compensable by money
damages? Is reinstatement to a former position sufficient? Is an
employee always compensated for salary lost between the date of
termination7 and the date of trial? What is includible in lost wages?
What effect has the termination had on the employee's pension
rights? The inquiry may be further complicated by factual circum-
stances peculiar to a particular case. For example, what if reinstate-
ment to a former position is inappropriate or impossible? Should
the employee then be compensated for lost salary until he reaches
retirement age? Or perhaps the employee might have been termi-
nated anyway, for a nondiscriminatory reason. How would this af-
fect the remedy available?
Therefore, at some time in preparing for trial of a suit charging
an ADEA violation, a practitioner pauses to consider the range of
remedies available under the Act and to examine more closely issues
related to those remedies. That time is usually after the plaintiff's
charge has been prepared and filed with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and, if appropriate, with the applica-
ble state agency.8 This pause for consideration may well arise after
6. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976), a case in which the Supreme
Court emphasized the breadth of the relief available to district courts in fashioning rem-
edies under Title VII to achieve the make-whole objective of that legislation). See also
Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir. 1982) (although the em-
ployee should be made "monetarily whole under his employment contract," he should
not receive "a windfall"); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
7. For the sake of simplicity, "termination" is often used here to include not only
the termination of an employee's job, but also other possible types of employment dis-
crimination (e.g., refusal to hire, refusal to promote, and demotion).
8. A charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation;
or, in "deferral states" (i.e., states that have laws prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and agencies empowered to seek to grant relief from the discriminatory
practice, see 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 694 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1981); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980)), within
300 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 30 days after receipt of notice of
termination of proceedings under state law, whichever is earlier. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(1982). In deferral states the claimant is required to pursue administrative state reme-
dies before filing suit. The federal and state administrative remedies may be pursued
simultaneously. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 757-58 (1979). Indeed, the
state filing need not be timely under state law in order to permit the claimant to proceed
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the suit is at issue in federal district court.9 Not only will it be neces-
sary to determine whether certain remedies are available and how
damages should be assessed, but also, if the matter is to be tried
before a jury,"° which issues should go to the jury and which should
be resolved by the judge. This article will address these and other
questions through a detailed examination of the legal and equitable
remedies available under the Act.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
"The ADEA broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the
workplace based on age."" Section 4 of the Act makes it unlawful
for an employer to "discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's age." 2 This broad proscription is enforced through the reme-
dies contained in section 7(b),' 3 but in part because of the Act's
express incorporation of the remedial provisions and procedures of
in federal court. Id. at 759. The claimant "need only commence the state action, even
though that action is subject to dismissal because of the late filing." Goodman v. Heu-
blein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1981). But see Borowski v. Vitro Corp., 40 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1056, 1058-59 & n.4 (D. Md. 1986) (holding, despite several
circuit court decisions to the contrary, that as long as the state limitations period is at
least 180 days "a timely state filing is a prerequisite for the availability of the 300 day
federal filing period under the ADEA or Title VII").
9. A plaintiff must wait 60 days after filing the charge with the EEOC before filing
suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park
Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 242 (S.D. Ga. 1982). In a deferral state the plaintiff must wait
60 days after commencing proceedings under state law. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 844 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
10. This article assumes that the plaintiff has chosen a jury trial. Although the range
of remedies discussed here is applicable to all ADEA trials, jury and nonjury, a practi-
tioner facing a court trial will not have to contend with decisions as to which remedies
should be considered by the court and which by the jury.
11. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
13. Section 7(b) of the ADEA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)) states, in perti-
nent part, the following:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for subsec-
tion (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act
prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act
under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a person as a result of a
violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or un-
paid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title:
300
1986] REMEDIES UNDER THE ADEA
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),' 4 the language of that section
is not a model of clarity. One court, in fact, has uncharitably de-
scribed the relevant provisions of the Act as "a model in impreci-
sion.""5 The Supreme Court less caustically has characterized the
Act's enforcement scheme as "complex" and "a hybrid."'' 6
The remedies set forth in section 7(b) include (a) "judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion"; 17 (b) "judg-
ments ... enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation";' 8 and (c) "liq-
uidated damages . . . in cases of willful violations."' 9 In addition,
because the FLSA section is incorporated by reference, "[t]he court
in such action shall ... allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid
by the defendant, and costs of the action. ' 20
Complications arise, however, not only from the incorporation
of the FLSA provisions, but also because the ADEA provides that a
Provided, That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful viola-
tions of this chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appro-
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation
judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing
the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation under this section.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
15. Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 578 (1978).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The principles to be applied in a case involving em-
ployment are the same as those to be applied in a reinstatement case. Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983). In the same manner
reinstatement principles apply in cases involving demotion and promotion. See Taylor v.
Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (employee demoted twice and rejected for
promotion); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.
1984) (employee demoted and later denied a promotion); Blim v. Western Elec. Co.,
731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.) (employees demoted), cert. denied sub non. AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984). See also DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037,
1043, 1045 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (employee rejected for promotion).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). This translates into "lost wages" or "back wages and
benefits." See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.4 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974,
978 (9th Cir. 1981); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.9 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir.
1977), afftd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). The remedial language of the FLSA, incorporated by
reference into the ADEA, specifically authorizes "the payment of wages lost." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The incorporated language of the FLSA specifies "an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
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court may grant "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act].' This sweeping
authorization is not limited by the types of relief spelled out in the
Act, which are exemplary only. 22 And the Act does not provide the
practitioner or the courts much help in distinguishing between legal
and equitable relief for purposes of a jury trial.23
B. Right To Jury Trial
As originally enacted, the ADEA was silent as to whether a jury
trial was available in an age discrimination suit. Most courts favored
the ability of a party to pray a jury trial.24 Those ruling to the con-
trary reasoned that Congress had modeled the ADEA after Title
V11 25 and, therefore, that a jury trial, unavailable in Title VII ac-
tions, should likewise be unavailable in actions brought under the
ADEA.26
21. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
22. Indeed, the relief that is specified is stated to be "without limitation." 29 U.S.C
§ 626(b) (1982).
23. The Supreme Court offered, at least as a helpful start, the following comment in
Lorillard v. Pons:
Section 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), does not specify which of the listed categories
of relief are legal and which are equitable. However, since it is clear that judg-
ments compelling "employment, reinstatement or promotion" are equitable,
see 5J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.21 (1977), Congress must have meant the
phrase "legal relief" to refer to judgments "enforcing ... liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation."
434 U.S. 575, 583 n.ll (1978).
24. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 838-39 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 952-53 (4th
Cir. 1977) (noting that in contrast to Title VII the ADEA authorizes legal as well as
equitable relief), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F.
Supp. 780, 788-89 (D. Md. 1978) (jury trial permitted on issues of back pay and liqui-
dated damages, not on issues of reinstatement, punitive damages, restoration of pension
rights, or attorneys' fees and costs); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201-22
(D. Or. 1977) (jury trial authorized as to liability, willfulness, legal damages for lost
wages, benefits, and pension rights, and for liquidated damages); Bertrand v. Orkin Ex-
terminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1130-32 (N.D. II1. 1976) (jury trial permitted at
least as to back pay claim), reaff'd, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cleverly v. Western
Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (jury trial permitted as to issues of back pay,
willfulness, and liquidated damages, not as to issues of reinstatement, attorneys' fees,
and costs), aff'd, 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979); Chilton v. National Cash Register Co.,
370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (jury trial permitted as to issues of lost wages and
benefits, not as to issues of liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976) (viewing the ac-
tion, including the back pay claim, as essentially for reinstatement and injunctive relief
and, hence, equitable in nature), vacated and renmanded, 435 U.S. 911 (1978); Travers %.
Corning Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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In 1978 the Supreme Court settled the issue when it affirmed
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Pons v. Lorillard2 7 and held that a
jury trial is available to a private sector employee seeking lost wages
under the ADEA.28 Congress had intended that FLSA procedures
be followed in enforcing the ADEA, the Court held, and because a
jury trial was permitted under the FLSA, an ADEA party could also
ask for ajury trial, at least as to "legal" issues such as a claim for lost
wages. 29 In that same year, Congress amended the ADEA and ad-
ded a provision specifically authorizing a jury trial. °
Subsequent cases have made clear that when a jury trial is
prayed, the jury hears and determines the legal issues and assesses
legal damages but the court determines equitable issues and awards
equitable relief.3 However, the roles of the court and of the jury
are not always so neatly separated. 2
27. 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
28. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). But see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156
(1981) (holding that a federal employee suing the government under the Act is not enti-
tled to a jury trial).
29. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-85 (1978). The Court expressed "no view
on the issue of the right to jury trial on a liquidated damages claim." Id. at 577 n.2.
30.
In an action brought under [section 7(c)(1)], a person shall be entitled to a trial
by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as
a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is
sought by any party in such action.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982).
31. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279-80 (8th Cir.
1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); see
also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1009 (1st Cir. 1979) (statement of district
court's action shows that jury dealt with legal issues and that equitable relief was
awarded by court).
32. Various approaches have been taken in allocating responsibilities between court
and jury, often at the suggestion or with the consent of counsel. See, e.g., O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1984) (afterjury
returned special verdict on liability and willfulness, district judge determined damages
by agreement of parties); McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 214-15 (3d Cir.
1984) (jury decided liability, damages issues submitted to a magistrate by stipulation of
parties), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985); Syvock v. Milwau-
kee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1981) (liability and issue of willfulness
tried to a jury; judge ruled on post-trial motions before commencing damages phase of
trial, then judge conducted a "bench trial on damages"); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d
691, 694, 701 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (special jury verdict was limited to two factual issues
relating to liability; remaining issues were reserved to the court, which conducted "fur-
ther proceedings" on damages); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977,
978 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (jury awarded damages; by agreement of parties, issue of willful-
ness and amount of liquidated damages determined by court, along with items of equita-
ble relief); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1979) (Iur
determined liability, damages, and issue of willfulness; equitable issues submitted to the
court on record made in jury trial and in supplemental nonjury evidentiarv hearing):
3031986]
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II. LEGAL DAMAGES
A. Amounts Owing-Back Pay and Benefits
Once liability is established, the most basic element to be deter-
mined by the jury is damages to compensate the plaintiff for
"amounts owing," i.e., back pay and lost benefits. 3 In Kolb v. Gold-
ring, Inc., the First Circuit pointed out that, in essence, an ADEA
case is "identical to a common law suit for back wages for breach of
contract, ' 35 and requires "a simple tabulation of 'items of pecuniary
or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related bene-
fits.' "36 Back pay is mandatory under the ADEA-in contrast to Ti-
tle VII, which leaves an award of back pay to the trial judge's
discretion'7-and basic employee benefits are also typically consid-
ered in calculating "amounts owing." However, in addition to the
question of what is included in "amounts owing," the practitioner
must confront the issue of how those damages are to be calculated.
For although the jury, as trier of fact, will assess damages for the
amount due a victim of age discrimination in a jury trial, the court
must instruct the jury as to the proper method of calculating that
amount.
1. Calculation of Back Pay.-Back pay is normally recoverable
from the date of the violation, but may be calculated to a variety of
termination dates. Depending upon the circumstances, courts have
held that back pay ceases on (1) the date of trial (or judgment);38 (2)
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 837 (3d Cir. 1977) (after jury
determined liability, parties stipulated to the amount of compensatory damages and
agreed to submit question of willfulness to the trial judge, who found willfulness and
doubled the award of compensatory damages), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975) (issue of liability submit-
ted to jury, but issue of damages, with approval of counsel, "decided in advance" by trial
judge).
33. See supra note 18.
34. 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982).
35. Id. at 872 (citing Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 844 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978)).
36. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 535).
37. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 794 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1985); McDowell v.
Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded on other gronnds,
105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1985); Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983); Blackwell v. Sun Elec.
Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638,
641 (8th Cir. 1979); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1974)
(dictum); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Stipp. 841,
304 [VOL. 45:298
1986] REMEDIES UNDER THE ADEA 305
the date on which the employee accepts or unreasonably declines
reinstatement; 9 (3) the date on which the court's order can be
implemented by having the employee reinstated into an appropriate
vacant position;40 (4) the date of reemployment by another em-
ployer in a comparable position;4 (5) the date on which the em-
ployee's salary in a subsequent position equals or surpasses the
salary he was receiving at the time of termination;42 (6) the date on
which the employee tells the employer he will not be returning to
work;43 (7) the date the employee reaches the normal retirement
age;44 (8) the date the employee reaches the maximum age pro-
tected by the ADEA;4 5 (9) the date the employee dies;46 or (10) the
844 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (N.D. Ga.
1973); cf. Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 699 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(parties stipulated in pretrial order to effective date ofjudgment, court limited recovery
to that date).
39. See, e.g., Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1982)
(but reasonable rejection of offer of reinstatement does not terminate back pay); Coates
v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662-63 (W.D. Va. 1977) (offer of rein-
statement must be a bona fide offer to resume the former position or a comparable one);
Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 597 (D.D.C. 1974); see also O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1550-51 (11 th Cir. 1984) (remanded to
district court to determine reasonableness of employee's refusal of offer of reinstate-
ment); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983)
(lower court instructed jury that back pay award must end if employees unreasonably
rejected good faith offer of employment, but jury found no unreasonable rejection);
Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 757 (7th Cir.) (back pay damages
not terminated by offer of reinstatement because not unreasonable for employee to re-
fuse offer), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
40. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 1983) (court re-
manded to district court for hearing on employer's delay in complying with earlier rein-
statement order; if no immediate vacancy, back pay was to continue until employer
"finds an appropriate vacancy" to which to reinstate employee).
41. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir.) (part-time
reemployment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp.
579, 594-96 (D.D.C. 1974) (if employee loses the new job, he will not be entitled to back
wages for the period from termination of that job until date of trial).
42. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 (Ist Cir. 1982) ("At that point, the
damages from his termination were complete and settled.").
43. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 259, 260 (5th Cir.
1985) (federal employee not selected for promotion, subsequently left job for medical
reasons; back pay held to terminate when he gave notice that he was not returning to
employment due to conditions of his health).
44. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in
part, rev'd in part, remanded mer.. 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
45. See Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (facts
show that employee reached age 62 in February 1974; back pay terminated on February
28, 1977, when employee reached age 65, the maximum age then protected by ADEA).
Currently, the ADEA protects those "who are at least 40 years of age but less than 70
years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). The protected age was raised from 65 to 70
by the ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
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date on which the employee would have been terminated for a non-
discriminatory reason.4 7 Thus, for example, if between discharge
and trial the employee's job is eliminated by a plant closing or even
by a mere work force reduction, the back pay recovery may be lim-
ited. Whether the employee would have been retained after the
plant closing or the reduction in force is a question of fact for the
jury.
4 8
Problems of calculation can be particularly difficult when termi-
nated employees obtain other employment. Suppose, for example,
victims of age discrimination earn less during the first year of subse-
quent employment than they would have earned in the job from
which they were terminated, and yet by the time of trial several years
later, their total earnings from the new job exceed that which they
would have earned had they not been terminated. Are they then
entitled to a back pay award? Presented with this question, the
Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's determination that the
sum of the plaintiff's back pay had been completely offset by the
total salary he had earned in alternative employment and, in re-
manding, directed the lower court to enter judgment for back pay
calculated on a year-by-year basis.49
Should back pay be adjusted to take into account the tax effects
of the award? For example, is the "gross" amount of lost wages
recoverable, or should the court give the employer credit for that
portion that the employee would have paid in taxes and order that
the employee be paid only a "net" back pay amount? Conversely,
should the court increase the back pay award to compensate for a
larger tax payment due on a lump sum award? These questions
have rarely arisen, but the authority that exists suggests that tax ef-
fects are not considered in determining back pay awards. For exam-
ple, in EEOC v. Riss International Corp. ,50 a Title VII case, the district
effective January 1, 1979. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1008 n.l (1st Cir.
1979).
46. Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744, 752-
53 (N.D.W. Va. 1974).
47. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982). See also
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming a jury back pay
award equal to one year's salary, concluding that teacher had not been hired on perma-
nent basis but for one year only), cert. detnied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
48. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1982).
49. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1983).
But see Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 596 (D.D.C. 1974) (court calculated
employee's back pay for period of 42 months, subtracted total salary earned in 42
months, and awarded employee the difference).
50. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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court rejected the employer's contention that back pay should be
calculated by reducing the employee's hypothetical earnings by
amounts that "would have been withheld for taxes and social secur-
ity," pointing out that "[t]here is little support for this method of
calculation.""1 The court observed that taxes "will be paid upon
payment of the back pay award."52 In Blim v. Western Electric Co. ,3
the Tenth Circuit reversed as improper a district court's inclusion in
the employee's back pay award of an additional amount for "in-
creased tax liability caused by the receipt of damages in a lump
sum." '5 4 The court of appeals noted that even though back pay will
be paid and taxed in a single year, "the tax laws contain five year
averaging provisions that will eliminate nearly all of any penalty that
would otherwise result from receipt of a lump sum payment."' '5 5
2. Prospective Salary Increases, Bonuses, and Commissions.-The
"amounts owing" to terminated employees may include not only
the wages actually lost, based upon their salaries at the time of the
violation, but also expected salary increases. Courts have upheld
the inclusion of prospective raises in back pay awards if the plaintiffs
could show that they might reasonably have received such raises had
they not been wrongfully discharged.56 In Kolb, the plaintiff did not
51. Id. at 425. But see Cross v. United States Postal Serv., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1442, 1446 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (court ordered that 10% of employee's Title VII
back pay award be withheld "for income tax purposes"), aff'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d
1327 (8th Cir. 1984).
52. EEOC v. Riss Int'l Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 425 (W.D. Mo.
1982). See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1480 n.2 (10th Cir.) ("Back pay is
taxable to the plaintiffs and subject to income tax and social security withholding."), cert.
denied sub nom. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
53. 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub non. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim,
105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
54. Id. at 1480. But see Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 749 F.2d 1451,
1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (district court did not abuse its discretion in including a "tax
component" in the Title VII back pay award to compensate class members for "addi-
tional tax liability" that would result from receiving over 17 years of back pay in one
lump sum; court distinguished Blim and pointed out that income averaging now permits
consideration of only three preceding years, that many class members had died, and that
estates are not eligible for income averaging), cert. denied sub nom. United Transp. Union
v. Sears, 105 S. Ct. 2322 (1985).
55. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub non.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
56. See, e.g., Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1985) (in demo-
tion case, employee's back pay claim based on what "he would have earned in salary
increases, bonuses, and promotions if the company had operated under a neutral policy
with regard to age"; award based on expert's testimony affirmed on appeal); Kolb v.
Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872-73 (1st Cir. 1982) (raise reduced on appeal to amount
reasonably supported by evidence); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149,
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introduce any evidence of company practice or policy from which it
could have been inferred that someone in his position would have
received a raise equal to the figure of $8,000 per year that the jury
included in its assessment of damages. Nor did he introduce expert
testimony showing comparable salary increases in the industry. He
did, however, show that his salary had increased dramatically in his
new job, that his successor was paid $6,000 per year more than he
had been paid, and that he had performed very well before being
fired. In holding that the raise component of the damages award
should be limited to $6,000 per year, the First Circuit emphasized
that convincing testimony was needed to support prospective raises,
pointing out that when courts have approved awards including pro-
spective raises, "the projection has been based on expert testimony,
patterns of past increases, or similar evidence." 57
Based upon evidence of company policy and the treatment of
other employees, prospective bonuses may also be included in a cal-
culation of an employee's damages, 58  and commission income is
likewise recoverable as back pay if established with sufficient cer-
tainty.59 In fact, in Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., a salesman's
160-61 (7th Cir. 1981) (court, not jury, made damage calculations; raises calculated by
using former co-worker's subsequent earnings as benchmark); Kelly v. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1981) (prospective raises based upon expert
economic testimony); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 &
n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (6% annual increases held to be "normal incident" of job); Com-
bes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (based upon
formula that would have determined pay had plaintiff remained on the job, court held
plaintiff entitled to "minimum 6% increases and cost of living increases"); cf. Mistretta v.
Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1980) (damages included compensation
for the continuing effect of the company "stretch out" policy, which prohibited salary
increases to employees in protected class equal to increases to employees outside the
class).
57. 694 F.2d 869, 873 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co.,
665 F.2d 149, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1981)); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974,
985-86 (9th Cir. 1981); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D.
Okla. 1976). But cf. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1164
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (raises justified because jury's verdict necessarily included finding that
the unsatisfactory performance reviews that made employee ineligible for raises were
pretextual).
58. Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1985); Whittlesey v. Union
Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085, 1086-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd,
742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984). But see Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744, 752 (N.D.W. Va. 1974) (recovery for expected bonuses
denied when employees failed to establish amount with reasonable certainty).
59. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 705, 712
(E.D. Wis. 1978).
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lost commissions from noncompeting outside apparel lines were re-
covered as "lost earnings."6 " In affirming the recovery on appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit characterized those commissions as a "concom-
itant" of the plaintiff's employment.6
3. Life Insurance Benefits. -Compensation for the loss of life in-
surance provided as a fringe benefit of employment may also be a
factor in making whole an employee unlawfully discharged because
of age, but courts have not agreed on how to measure the loss of
that benefit. For example, the Fourth Circuit regards the premiums
that the employer would have had to pay for the terminated em-
ployee's life insurance policy to be the appropriate measure because
Congress did not intend "to transform employers into insurers
merely because an insurance policy is part of the compensation for
employment."6 2 On the other hand, the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico held that unlawfully dis-
charged employees are entitled to recover as a lost benefit the value
of their increased paid-up life insurance.63
4. Pension Benefits. -Although an award of pension benefits is
"plainly authorized under the ADEA," 64 compensating the dis-
charged employee for the loss presents special problems. In order
to fulfill the Act's purpose of making the employee whole, the back
pay award might include a damage factor to compensate the em-
ployee for the loss of pension benefits resulting from his termina-
tion.65 Alternatively, the court might order the employer to pay into
60. 758 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 1446.
62. Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1985).
63. Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1671 (D.N.M. 1978),
aff'd, 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980).
64. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979). The court explained:
"Congress intended that the calculation of 'amounts owing' to a prevailing plaintiff in-
clude 'items of pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related
benefits.' . . . Pension benefits are part of an individual's compensation and, like an
award of back pay, should be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)." Id. (citation omitted).
65. That was the approach taken at trial in Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640
F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981). Included in the jury's award of damages was an amount specif-
ically to compensate the employee for lost pension benefits. Id. at 977. That aspect of
the award was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 985-86. The court noted that "pension rights
... are proper elements of damage under the ADEA, and their present value is recover-
able based on expert testimony." Id. at 986 n.20. See also Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler
Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161 (7th Cir. 1981) (lower court correctly added to back pay
award contributions employer would have made to pension fund): Merkel v. Scovill,
Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (employees entitled to have amounts that
would have been contributed from date of discharge posted to pension plan as part of
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the pension plan an amount sufficient to provide the employee with
the same pension that he would have received had he not been dis-
criminatorily discharged.66 The first approach treats the pension
loss as legal damages and requires presenting the issue to the jury.6 7
The alternative approach treats the pension plan adjustment as eq-
uitable relief and requires the court to deal with it during the equita-
ble phase of the case.68 Sometimes both legal and equitable aspects
are present in the same case.69
back pay award; although paid to plan, amounts were included in back pay award in
determining amount of liquidated damages), rev'don other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.
1986); Bleakley v.Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 245 (S.D. Ga. 1982)
("a successful ADEA plaintiff is entitled to the present discounted value of a pension
award based on employment from when the plaintiff was first hired until the date of the
trial"); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("the
appropriate measure of relief is the amount of salary lost ... increased by the value of
her pension benefits"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded mem., 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir.
1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (employee
entitled to recover pension benefits "as if he had been permitted to work" during the
back pay period); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Or. 1977) ("Lost
wages, benefits, and pension rights are the types of legal damages which a jury may
assess in ADEA actions.").
66. See Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1099 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) ("If a prevailing plaintiff is
returned to the defendant's employment, this award will consist of payments to the pen-
sion fund on plaintiff's behalf, bringing plaintiff's pension interest to the level it would
have reached absent discrimination."). See also EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1168, 1173 (10th Cir.) (parties stipulated that a specific amount
be paid to employee as "additional equitable relief" in order to provide employee "the
same pension upon retirement that he would have received had he not been illegally
discharged"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d
214, 215 (3d Cir. 1984) (parties stipulated to payment into pension plan), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d
1176, 1185 n.15 (6th Cir. 1983) (employee had not requested reinstatement; if he had,
and had the district court granted reinstatement, "[p]erhaps, under those circumstances,
an equitable solution would be to provide that Sun post to the plaintiff's pension plan
the amount that would have been contributed in the period between the unlawful dis-
charge and reinstatement").
67. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1981); Fellows
v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Or. 1977). See also Gibson v. Mohawk
Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that on remand the jury
should determine damages to compensate the employee "for the wages and specific
monetary benefits, such as pension benefits, that he would have received but for Mo-
hawk's violation of the ADEA").
68. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279 n.2, 281 (8th Cir.
1983); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1009, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979); Cleverly v.
Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1979).
69. In Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982), the case was
remanded to the district court for a determination of both legal and equitable relief.
The jury was to award damages to compensate the plaintiff for lost wages and specific
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5. Other Lost Benefits.-As with any damage award, recovery in
an age discrimination case of an amount to compensate for various
lost employment benefits appears to depend not so much on the
name of the benefit as on the precision with which the value of the
lost benefit is proven. ° Thus, in one reported case a district judge,
sitting without a jury, awarded the plaintiff as an element of dam-
ages the unrealized profit he lost on unexercised stock options. 7'
Accrued sick leave has been included in a computation of back
pay,72 as have an employee expense account, 73 a clothing dis-
count,7 4 and even something characterized as "business start-up
costs. ' ' 75 A back pay award may also include, if appropriate, com-
pensation for the value of "health insurance, seniority, leave-time,
or other fringe benefits which the employee would have accrued
during the back pay period but for the violation of the Act."-
76
monetary benefits, including pension benefits. In addition, the district court was di-
rected to reconsider the plaintiff's request for equitable relief, including, among other
things, "additional pension benefits." Id. at 1100. See also Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co.,
445 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (court, sitting without a jury, ordered recovery
for pension benefits lost during the back pay period; court also ordered employer to
provide future pension benefits based upon entitlement as if employee had worked
through the back pay period).
70. Clearly, if the evidence at trial does not support the claimed benefit, or if the
claim is too speculative, recovery will not be permitted. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec.
Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983) (no recovery for greater prospective earn-
ings because of expanded sales territory and greater discount policy); Kolb v. Goldring,
Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 873-74 (1st Cir. 1982) (recovery of value of use of company car not
permitted); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085,
1088-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (anticipated future stock options disallowed), aft'd, 742 F.2d
724 (2d Cir. 1984).
71. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085, 1088-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984). The district court established a
valuation of the options based upon the increase in the price of the stock from the date
options were last issued to the date of the court's ruling. Even though the options were
not exercisable until more than one year had elapsed, the court determined that "to-
day's price is a more likely future price than any particular deviation from it." However,
the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a recovery for the value of
options that he expected to receive in the future, had his employment not been termi-
nated. Id.
72. Alford v. City of Lubbock, 484 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
73. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir. 1982) (court viewed $5,000
expense account to some extent as personal and yet of general benefit to employer;
thus, included one-half of amount in recoverable back pay).
74. Id. at 872. But the employee's use of a company car was not allowed as an ele-
ment of damages because the employee failed to introduce evidence of the economic
value of the car and left the jury with "no basis for computation whatever." Id. at 873-
74.
75. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1981).
76. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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B. Mitigation of Damages and Set Offs
Although many elements of compensation other than base sal-
ary may be included in determining an ADEA plaintiff's lost wages
and benefits, certain other items are properly subtracted from back
pay in fixing the amount of recoverable damages.77
1. Employee's Duty to Mitigate.-Even though terminated be-
cause of age, an employee has a duty to mitigate damages by making
reasonable efforts to seek alternative employment.78 Thus, the most
common offsets are amounts earned by the plaintiff in subsequent
employment. 79 The remedial "make whole" purpose of the ADEA
Compare Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (6th Cir. 1983) (recovery
of health benefits allowed as equitable relief) with Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co.,
665 F.2d 149, 161 (7th Cir. 1981) (inclusion in back pay award of cost of lost health
insurance benefits discretionary; not compensated because employee had not purchased
alternative coverage); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 145-46 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(employees not entitled to recover as back pay amount of insurance premiums that
would have been paid to carrier; employees can recover for medical expenses that would
have been covered and for amounts expended in purchasing replacement coverage),
rev'don other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F.
Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (recovery of health insurance benefits not allowed);
Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744, 752
(N.D.W. Va. 1974) (hospital and medical insurance premiums not included in damages).
In Buchholz, the court implied that vacation time may be a compensable item if not
already included in income used to compute the back pay award. 445 F. Supp. at 713.
77. The ADEA does not contain language equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982) [Title VII], which provides: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reason-
able diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable." See, e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 149
(S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986). In effectuating the
ADEA's objective of make-whole relief, even though not mandated by the Act, courts
have applied a set off requirement that ADEA back pay awards be similarly reduced. See,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978).
78. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1983); Jackson v.
Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1983); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689
F.2d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir.
1980). See also Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.) (jury prop-
erly instructed on plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981);
Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Coates v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662 (W.D. Va. 1977).
79. See, e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 148-49 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986). The measure of back pay is "the differ-
ence between the salary an employee would have received but for the violation of the
Act and the salary actually received from other employment." Coates v. National Cash
Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977). See also Coleman v. City of
Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697
F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 & n.23 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.
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is fulfilled if terminated employees are permitted to recover an
amount sufficient to put them in the economic position in which
they would have been had the discriminatory act not occurred. But
the employee is not entitled to a windfall.8 0 Thus, when the plain-
tiffs have received a subsequent salary in an interim position, to per-
mit a full recovery from the discriminating employer of back pay lost
from the job in which they had been terminated would make the
employees better than "whole," because they would be placed in a
better position economically than had they not been the victims of
discrimination. 1
Because of the employee's duty to mitigate, the employer may
also be entitled to offset an amount that terminated employees
could have earned had they sought alternative employment with
reasonable diligence.8 2 If mitigation is an issue at trial, the burden
Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded mem., 608 F.2d 1369
(2d Cir. 1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Hodgson
v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744, 752 (N.D.W. Va.
1974); Bishop v.JelleffAssocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 594-96 (D.D.C. 1974). Essentially the
same standard applies in the case of a refusal to hire as it does in the case of a termi-
nated employee. "[T]he damages would be the difference between what the applicant
would have received in specific monetary benefits prior to trial had he been hired less
whatever he received in wages if he secured employment." Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1974).
80. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir. 1982).
81. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 149 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'don other
grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986). However, in a situation in which the employee
received income from teaching and lecturing between the time of his discharge and trial,
the Sixth Circuit held that the set off was proper only to the extent that the amount
actually received exceeded that which the employee would have received had he contin-
ued to be employed by the discharging employer. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d
307, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1975). Similarly, the Third Circuit observed that a deduction for
interim wages was proper if earned from other employment that the employee "could
not have simultaneously performed." Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 & n.23
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). An Illinois district court declined to
deduct from the back pay award overtime compensation received by the employee
(while continuing to work in a position from which she had been denied a promotion),
equating the overtime compensation to "earnings derived from moonlighting." Even
though the employee's additional earnings came from her regular job in overtime hours
rather than from a second job, "the policy remains the same. The plaintiff should not be
punished for additional earnings if she could earn them while holding the desired posi-
tion and if there is reason to believe she would do so." DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F.
Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
82. Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983); Buchholz v. Sy-
mons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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of showing failure to mitigate is on the employer.8 3 More is re-
quired, of course, than a showing that the terminated employee re-
mained unemployed. The employer may seek to reduce the back
pay award by producing evidence that positions were available for
which the employee was qualified and which he or she could have
obtained, and that the employee failed to use reasonable diligence
in seeking such a position. 4 The terminated employee is required
to look for and accept employment only in a comparable or "sub-
stantially equivalent" position, 85 i.e., one that is similar in terms of
"status, salary, benefits, and potential for advancement" to the job
from which he or she was terminated.86 Indeed, an employee is not
required to pursue every possible job opportunity. In Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, Inc. ,87 for example, the district court found that a
terminated employee's failure to respond to several job advertise-
ments did not constitute a failure to mitigate when the employer
failed to show either that the openings were "comparable in pay,
status and other factors" or that they were suitable for a person of
the employee's qualifications. 8 In seeking a comparable position,
the employee is not held to the highest standard; instead, applying
the test of reasonable diligence, the employee must make "only an
honest good faith effort."
8 9
83. Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Shell
Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d
481,489 n.8 (4th Cir. 1982); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 159-60
(7th Cir. 1981).
84. Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sandia
Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. SeeJackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sandia
Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980); cf. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433
F. Supp. 655, 662-63 (W.D. Va. 1977) (to be bona fide, offer of reemployment must be
to comparable position).
86. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977). g
87. 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, revd in part, remanded mere., 608
F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 730. The flexibility of the "reasonable diligence" standard is apparent in
the court's explanation that behavior not entirely reasonable may be reasonable enough
for purposes of "reasonable diligence." Even if there had been comparable positions
advertised, the court noted, failure to pursue them would not have been fatal if, as the
court held it did, the plaintiff's conduct "came within the range of reason, even if the full
light of reason was not, in fact, brought to bear." Id. at 731 (quoting Ellerman Lines,
Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1961)). See also Orzel v. City
of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756-57 (7th Cir.) (employee's efforts, though
"less than vigorous," did not constitute a failure to mitigate), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992
(1983).
89. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 938 (10th Cir. 1979), a Title VII
case).
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The plaintiff is not required to be successful in finding another
job."0 Nor does "reasonable diligence" require that terminated em-
ployees exert unusual efforts in seeking employment. For example,
they are not expected to accept ajob that is located an unreasonable
distance from their home. 9' Nor are they expected to pursue a job
opportunity that would require them to relocate within three years
of their anticipated retirement.92 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has
determined that terminated employees do not fail in their duty to
mitigate merely by switching to another business after being dis-
charged from a higher paying job.93 The "reasonable diligence"
standard does, of course, require some reasonable effort on the part
of the employee. For example, the Seventh Circuit has upheld the
conclusion of a district court judge that an employee did not act
with reasonable diligence and failed to mitigate his damages by tak-
ing what was characterized as "a sabbatical" from work while col-
lecting unemployment compensation. 4  In any event, the
reasonableness of the employee's efforts at mitigation is a jury
question.95
2. Set Offs. -Courts have had difficulty in fashioning clear rules
on whether the employer is entitled to set off against an award of
back pay amounts collected by the employee from the terminating
employer during the back pay period, such as severance or vacation
pay, or payments derived from other sources, such as unemploy-
ment compensation or social security benefits. Severance pay re-
ceived from the terminating employer is generally held to be
properly deductible from the back pay award on the theory that it is
90. Id.
91. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1983); Coleman v.
City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983).
92. Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
93. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1982). See also
Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983) (reasonable for a successful
salesman of animal health products to go into sales of real estate).
94. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 160 n.14 (7th Cir. 1981).
95. Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983). The issue of what is
reasonable diligence in mitigating damages may be complicated in a situation in which
the employees are bound by a noncompetition agreement with their employer, particu-
larly if they know only the business in which they have worked for the employer. The
employees find themselves in a "catch-22" position if, as is frequently the case, employ-
ment with a competing employer constitutes a violation of the noncompetition agree-
ment that results in the loss or postponement of pension benefits. Reasonable diligence
in mitigating damages should not require those employees to seek employment in the
same industry and thus expose themselves to loss of pension benefits.
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"an incident of termination" that the employee would not have re-
ceived had his or her employment continued.9 6 Vacation pay or ac-
cumulated leave time, on the other hand, because earned by the
employee, does not result from the termination and should not be
offset against the back pay award.9 7 Although severance pay and
vacation pay have been contrasted, 98 at least one court treated them
identically in deferring the date for beginning the computation of
back pay.99
Some courts have drawn distinctions between benefits received
from the employer and those originating elsewhere by applying the
"collateral source" rule,'0 0 and have held that an employer is not
entitled to benefit by taking a deduction for amounts the employee
received from a collateral source. In Maxfield v. Sinclair Interna-
tional,'0 1 for example, the Third Circuit held:
Under the collateral source rule payments under So-
cial Security, welfare programs, unemployment compensa-
tion and similar programs have all been treated as
collateral benefits which would not ordinarily be set off
against damages awarded....
96. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626-27 (10th Cir. 1980) ("layoff allow-
ance"); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975); Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
remanded mem., 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433
F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217
(N.D. Ga. 1973); cf. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir. 1982)
(principle applied and offset ordered as to value of company stock that employee was
entitled to receive upon discharge from employment; case remanded for lower court to
enter order taking into account contingencies relating to possible reinstatement and
subsequent separation).
97. Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 1980). But see Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649
F.2d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 1981), affirming the district court's deduction of accumulated
sick leave and vacation pay benefits because the Bank's policy did not permit those bene-
fits to be "cashed out," but required retiring workers to use them. Thus, the benefits
could not have resulted in additional compensation to the employee in the event of
normal retirement, and but for his termination he would not have received them.
98. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975).
99. Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
100. "Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by an injured party from a
source wholly independent of the wrongdoer should not be deducted from the damages
that the wrongdoer otherwise is compelled to pay the injured party." Naton v. Bank of
Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981). "This rule holds even though the benefits are
payable to the plaintiff because of the defendant's actionable conduct and even though
the benefits are measured by the plaintiff's losses." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE I,\w
OF REMEDIES § 3.6 (1973).
101. 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985).
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... [W]e see no reason why the benefit of the collateral
funds should shift to the defendant. . . . As between the
employer, whose action caused the discharge, and the em-
ployee, who may have experienced other noncompensable
losses, it is fitting that the burden be placed on the
employer. 0 2
On the other hand, if the source of the benefit is not collateral,
courts have allowed the employer to set off the benefit amount in
order that the employee not be permitted a windfall or a double
recovery.' 0 3 The goal, of course, in making the employee whole is
to permit recovery of only that which the employee would have re-
ceived but for the violation of the Act.
Unemployment compensation received by a terminated em-
ployee subsequent to discharge has been the subject of similar anal-
ysis, but with varying results. The earlier decisions tended, without
discussion, to give the employer the benefit of an offset and permit
the amount received to be deducted from the award of back pay.10 4
(Indeed, in one case the parties agreed that the proper measure of
back pay required the deduction of unemployment benefits.)1 0 5 In
1977, however, the Fifth Circuit reached a different result in Mar-
shall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 106 Relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 107 which arose in a differ-
ent context, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not
abused its discretion by declining to deduct from the back pay award
102. Id. at 793-95. See also, EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 625, 626-27 (10th
Cir. 1980) (unemployment compensation collateral, not deducted; severance pay and
layoff allowances not collateral, employer entitled to deduct); Wise v. Olan Mills Inc.,
495 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (D. Colo. 1980) (social security benefits collateral, not de-
ducted; pension or retirement payments not collateral, employer entitled to deduct).
103. See, e.g., Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir. 1982); Wise
v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D. Colo. 1980).
104. See, e.g., Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va.
1977); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 595-96 (D.D.C. 1974); Hodgson v.
Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744, 752 (N.D.W. Va. 1974);
Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1973). By contrast, cases
arising under Title VII frequently refused to permit the employer to offset unemploy-
ment compensation, holding that unemployment compensation was collateral and
awarded to the employee by the state in furtherance of a separate social policy. See, e.g.,
Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 951 (D. Colo.
1979) (reimbursement of unemployment compensation to state mandated by law);
Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1115 (D. Md. 1977) (proposition
stated in text affirmed), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.
1981); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 437-38 (D. Utah 1971).
105. Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
106. 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
107. 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951).
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payments received by the employee as unemployment compensa-
tion after his discharge.' 0 8 Subsequent cases have divided on
whether unemployment compensation should be offset. In 1980 the
Tenth Circuit reviewed a number of cases and decided that "unem-
ployment compensation is purely a collateral source and is pecu-
liarly the property of the claimant,"' 1 9 and therefore that such
benefits should not be deducted.1 0 The Ninth Circuit has acknowl-
edged some doubt about the applicability of the collateral source
rule to unemployment compensation benefits because the employer
contributes to the unemployment compensation fund."' Without
resolving this doubt, it has held that the ADEA authorizes a district
court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a remedy and that a
district court does not abuse its discretion by deducting unemploy-
ment compensation from a back pay award." 2 Similarly, the Sev-
enth Circuit has held that the deduction of unemployment
compensation benefits by the trial court is not an abuse of discre-
tion." 3 Most recently, however, the Third Circuit rejected the con-
cept of discretion in this context, holding that "unemployment
compensation benefits, even if supported by contributions by the
employer, may not be deducted from a ADEA back pay award."'"
The question of whether an employee's receipt of social secur-
ity benefits entitles the employer to an offset has been considered
108. 554 F.2d at 736.
109. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-26 (10th Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 625. The Tenth Circuit was concerned that permitting an offset "may well
result in a windfall to the employer." Id. at 626. See also Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 257, 259 (D. Colo. 1980) (following Sandia as to unemployment compensation;
holding social security benefits nondeductible by analogy to unemployment
compensation).
111. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 700.
113. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 992 (1983); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161-62 & n.17
(7th Cir. 1981) (court noted that either employer or employee would receive a
"windfall").
114. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 215-16, 217 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985). See also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l,
766 F.2d 788, 793-95 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding no significant discernible differences be-
tween social security benefits, pension benefits, and unemployment compensation; all
are nondeductible). In McDowell, the court pointed out that the Third, Fourth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits had all adopted the rule that unemployment benefits may not be
deducted from a Title VII back pay award. 740 F.2d at 216. See Craig v. Y&Y Snacks,
Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 81-85 (3d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195-96
(4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other groumds, 458 U.S. 219 (1982), adhered to original position on
remand, 688 F.2d 951, 952 (4th Cir. 1982); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343,
346-47 (9th Cir. decided 1982; amended 1983); Brown v. AJ. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715
F.2d 1549, 1550-51 (11 th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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infrequently. In two reported decisions courts have held that an
employer is not entitled to such a deduction, applying the reasoning
of those courts that have refused to permit an offset for unemploy-
ment compensation." 5 Although the Third Circuit has recently
held that an employer is not entitled to offset pension plan benefits
received by the employee,' 16 most courts that have considered the
matter have concluded that retirement and pension benefits are
properly deducted from back pay." 7 And in a case in which the
employee had become totally disabled and unable to work, the court
offset against back pay the disability compensation received by the
employee." 18
In sum, an employee's award of back pay may be reduced by
earnings received from interim employment, by amounts "earn-
able" (even though not earned) in fulfilling the duty to mitigate
damages, and by such other amounts received by the employee after
termination as the court finds appropriately deductible. However,
whereas questions relating to mitigation of damages are properly
presented to the jury, the court itself must determine as a matter of
law whether deductions or offsets should be permitted for unem-
ployment compensation, social security benefits, pension benefits,
and the like. Although the court might instruct the jury either to
deduct or not to deduct, the better practice is to have the court
make the deduction itself from the jury's back pay award." 9
115. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 793-95 (3d Cir. 1985) ("There are no
significant discernible differences between Social Security benefits, unemployment ben-
efits and pension benefits for this purpose."); Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 496 F. Supp. 257,
260 (D. Colo. 1980) (social security payments held to be collateral and as much "social
insurance" benefits as unemployment compensation). But see EEOC v. Wyoming Retire-
ment Sys., 711 F.2d 1425, 1431-32 (10th Cir. 1985) (not abuse of discretion for trial
judge to deduct claimants' social security payments from back pay award, even though
from collateral source; because state was a party and tax funds were at stake, trial court
identified a "clear public interest" in deducting payments).
116. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985). See also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788, 794-95 (3d Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 966 (4th Cir. 1985) (em-
ployee had died, and court noted that had he continued working until he died, pension
would not have been paid at all); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86-87 (2d
Cir. 1983) (employer properly credited with that portion of lump sum pension payment
that represented difference between amount employee in fact received at age 63 and
lesser amount he would have received at age 65); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't,
697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Wise v. Olan Mills Inc.,
495 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D. Colo. 1980).
118. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1985).
119. See, e.g., Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 80, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983).
See also Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1985) (grant of
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C. Liquidated Damages
If the jury finds that an employer has violated the ADEA, it
must first determine the appropriate amount of monetary damages
to compensate the plaintiff for lost wages and benefits. If there are
facts that justify the finding, the jury may also be asked to determine
whether the employer's actions were willful.' If the jury finds the
employer's conduct to have been willful, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover liquidated damages in an additional amount equal to the
back pay award. 12 1 In effect, the back pay award is doubled.'22
For several years the courts of appeals wrestled with the mean-
ing of "willfulness" in the ADEA context, 23 and trial courts were
without clear guidance in framing an appropriate jury instruction
defining willful conduct. 1 24 Finally, in 1985 the Supreme Court ap-
proved a definition of "willfulness" in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
summary judgment for the employer upheld on grounds that the pension benefits that
the employer was entitled to offset were greater than the claim for back pay, and thus
that the plaintiff would be entitled to no monetary relief even if she were to prevail on
the merits).
120. Willfulness is a legal issue and is properly determined by the jury. When the
Supreme Court decided in Lorillard v. Pons that a jury trial is available in a private suit
seeking lost wages under the ADEA, 434 U.S. at 580-85, it declined to rule on the issue
of whether the right to ajury trial existed with respect to a liquidated damages claim. Id.
at 577 n.2. Most cases before and since, however, have held that the willfulness of the
employer's conduct is a jury issue. See, e.g., Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638,
640 (8th Cir. 1979); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 788-89 (D. Md.
1978). When Congress amended the ADEA in 1978 to provide specifically for the right
to jury trial, the report of the Congressional Conference Committee pointed out: "Be-
cause liquidated damages are in the nature of legal relief, it is manifest that a party is
entitled to have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by a jury." H.R. REP.
No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504,
535. See Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 129-30 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (incorporated by reference into the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1982)). See, e.g., Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 967 (4th Cir.
1985); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 n.4 (9th Cir.), rert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
122. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 757 n.27 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir.
1980).
123. "The Act itself does not define 'willful,' nor does it provide guidance in fashion-
ing such a definition." Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 921 n.4 (6th Cir.
1984). "[I]t is apparent that this unfortunate word is capable ofa multitude of meanings
and that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has been willing to fashion a precise
meaning for it." Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980).
124. See, e.g., Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 859 (4th Cir. 1985); Davis v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 921-22 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S.
Ct. 896, modifiedon remand, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173-75 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312
(1985); McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated and
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Thurston.'25 To find willfulness, the Court held, the jury must decide
that the employer knew its conduct violated the Act, or, in commit-
ting the discriminatory action, that the employer showed reckless
disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the Act. 1 2 6
Even though they result from the employer's willful conduct,
liquidated damages have been held to be compensatory.' 27 They
"are intended to provide compensation for losses that cannot be
calculated with certainty," such as the value attributable to the loss
of use of unpaid wages after an employee has been unlawfully dis-
charged.'28 The Ninth Circuit has reasoned, however, that "[t]he
award of liquidated damages is in effect a substitute for punitive
damages and is intended to deter intentional violations of the
ADEA."' ° In deciding the Thurston case, the Supreme Court ob-
served that "Congress intended for liquidated damages to be puni-
tive in nature.'1 3 0
If willfulness is found, is the back pay award doubled before or
after deducting any amounts to which the employer is entitled as an
offset? In Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 3' the Fourth Circuit recently
answered that question by holding that "liquidated damages should
be assessed only upon the net loss after offsets."'' 32 In Fariss no liq-
uidated damages were awarded because the employee's claim for
remanded, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1183-85
(6th Cir. 1983); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-58 (7th Cir.
1981); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 860 (1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979-81 (9th Cir. 1981);
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279-83 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1020 & n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
125. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
126. Id. at 625-26. See Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 967 (4th Cir.
1985).
127. Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 967 (4th Cir. 1985).
128. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982).
129. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th
Cir. 1981).
130. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1985). See Dicker-
son v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 783 F.2d 149, 150 (8th Cir. 1986).
131. 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 967. In Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1983), the
district court had deducted pension payments "and then doubled the remainder." The
appellate court affirmed without commenting on the procedure. See also McDowell v.
Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1984) (deducting pension benefits from a
back pay award gives the employer a double deduction if liquidated damages are
awarded; because liquidated damages are measured by doubling the back pay award
(after deductions), "for every dollar deducted from back pay a dollar is deducted from
the liquidated damages award"), vacated and remanded on otlier grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159
(1985).
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back wages and benefits was more than offset by the lump sum pen-
sion benefit he received as a result of his termination. 133
Although the issue of willfulness is to be submitted to the
jury, 134 the courts have not been consistent on whether the jury or
the court assesses the "additional equal amount as liquidated dam-
ages." 1 35 It should not matter, of course, because the amount to be
awarded as liquidated damages is the same as the damages assessed
for lost wages and other benefits. The Sixth Circuit has observed
that the district court is "without discretion, once the jury found
willfulness, to award liquidated damages in an amount other than
that equal to the award for compensatory damages."' 1 6 The better
133. 769 F.2d at 967.
134. The Third Circuit rejected an employer's contention that "procedurally, the final
decision to award liquidated damages properly rested with the court rather than the
jury." Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980).
135. In Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982), for ex-
ample, the jury found willfulness and, as part of its verdict, awarded the plaintiff the
additional equal amount in liquidated damages. In other cases, however, courts have
assessed the amount of liquidated damages after the jury returned a finding of willful-
ness. See, e.g., Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 851 (4th Cir. 1985); Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1983); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1009 (1st Cir. 1979). In a Ninth Circuit case, the jury returned a
general verdict that included compensatory and liquidated damages under the ADEA as
well as damages on pendent state claims. Although it affirmed on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit stated a strong preference for a separate verdict for each claim. Cancellier v.
Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
The Sixth Circuit noted in Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 n.13 (6th
Cir. 1983), that the preferable practice is "to submit the willfulness issue to the jury by
special interrogatory." That practice had been followed by the trial court in Loeb. See
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1009 (1st Cir. 1979).
136. Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983). But see Davis v. Combus-
tion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir. 1984) (jury awarded $22,200 in back pay,
district court awarded $20,000 in liquidated damages; award affirmed on appeal without
comment); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3d Cir. 1977) (leaving the award
of liquidated damages to the trial judge's discretion on remand), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844-45 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (court concluded that it had discretion "to award no liquidated damages or to
award liquidated damages in a lesser sum than the entire amount of back wages and
benefits").
The Fifth Circuit, apparently alone among the circuits, takes the position that liqui-
dated damages are not mandatory but permissive.
Hence if, after a jury finding of willfulness, the trial court makes a finding that
the employer acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that
its actions were not violative of the ADEA, the trial court possesses the discre-
tion to determine the amount, if any, of a liquidated damages award.
Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (5th Cir.), reh k ell banc
denied, 721 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub norn. Elliott v. Group Hosp. Serv.,
Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2658 (1984) (citing Hendrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir.
1981); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976)). The Fifth Circuit's
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procedure is to have the question of willfulness presented to the
jury by special interrogatory. Then, if the jury finds willfulness, the
court will assess liquidated damages as part of its overall award of
damages and other relief.
To the extent that liquidated damages can be considered puni-
tive in nature, a plaintiff may request such damages for willful con-
duct by the employer occurring after the plaintiff initiates the
lawsuit. At least one court has indicated that post-trial liquidated
damages might be awarded in an appropriate case for willfulness
such as "the prosecution of a patently frivolous appeal or extensive
and unwarranted dilatory tactics on the part of a defendant in the
face of a clear violation of the ADEA."'
13 7
D. Damages for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages
Compensatory damages for pain and suffering are not included
among the available remedies enumerated in the ADEA.' 38 Em-
ployee plaintiffs, however, have frequently sought to recover dam-
ages for pain and suffering, claiming that the availability of such
damages may be inferred from the Act's broad provision for "legal
and equitable relief."' 39 All circuit courts that have addressed the
issue have determined that damages for pain and suffering are not
available to a wronged employee under the Act.' 4 ° The reasons
reasoning has been criticized. See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 & n.26 (1st Cir. 1979); Babb v.
Sun Co., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 491, 493 (D. Minn. 1983) ("[I]t is difficult to comprehend
how an employer can willfully violate the ADEA while at the same time acting in good
faith."). In a recent case arising subsequent to the Supreme Court's definition of "will-
fulness" in Thurston, the Fifth Circuit has retreated from its rule that liquidated damages
are discretionary when willfulness is found. "Prior to Thurston, it was possible to find a
willful violation, and also find that the employer had acted in 'good faith.' . . . Under the
Thurston rule, however, 'good faith' can no longer coexist with 'willfulness.' " Powell v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 788 F.2d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1986).
137. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 783 F.2d 149, 150 (8th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff not entitled to post-trial liquidated damages because employer made reason-
able, good faith attempt to comply with both district court's judgment and mandate of
court of appeals).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982) (the only section of the Act that addresses remedies).
"The statute does not specifically mention damages for pain and suffering or other gen-
eral compensatory damages, and such damages are conspicuously omitted from the defi-
nition of'amounts owing.' " Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),(c) (1982).
140. See, e.g., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982); Pfeiffer v.
Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 685-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982);
Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v.
Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590
F.2d 1292, 1293-96 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107,
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usually offered for denying damages for pain and suffering are that
because those damages are not available under the FLSA, on which
the ADEA's remedial provisions are based, they are not recoverable
under the ADEA;' 4 1 that the possibility of recovering damages for
pain and suffering would impair the EEOC's mediation and concilia-
tion efforts in ADEA cases;' 42 and that damages for pain and suffer-
ing are inconsistent with the Act's goal of putting the ADEA
plaintiffs in the economic position they would have occupied but for
the discrimination. 1
43
Using similar reasoning, most courts have concluded that puni-
tive damages are not authorized under the ADEA. 144 However, be-
cause the Act requires a doubling of damages in cases of willful
violations, the Ninth Circuit has noted that the provision for liqui-
dated damages operates as a substitute for punitive damages.'
4 5
109-12 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550
F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
Although no circuit court has ruled in favor of damages for pain and suffering, sev-
eral district courts have done so in circuits that have not ruled against those damages.
Those courts have reasoned that Congress expressed concern for the emotional as well
as the financial well-being of older workers and have concluded that the phase "such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate," which appears in 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),
provides an opportunity to compensate ADEA victims for the psychological effects of
discrimination and, thus, to make them "whole." See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 485 F.
Supp. 542, 543-45 (D. Colo. 1980); Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 463-
64 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713-14 (E.D. Wis.
1978); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
141. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.
1982); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1979); Vaz-
quez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1978).
142. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 685-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir.
1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-
42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
143. See, e.g., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982).
144. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 685-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 129-30 (4th Cir.
1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 784
(D. Md. 1978). But see Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542, 543-45 (D. Colo. 1980);
Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1978).
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. See also Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics,
458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ("The limitation of liquidated damage awards
to compensation for 'willful' violations indicates that they have the effect of penalty.").
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E. Other Compensatory Damages
In the occasional case in which an aggrieved employee has
sought non-pain-and-suffering compensatory damages under the
ADEA, the attempt has been unsuccessful. For example, one plain-
tiff sought compensation for moving expenses, increased commut-
ing expenses, and increased payments on his new house due to a
higher interest rate, all because he had to sell his house and secure
employment in another state after a discriminatory discharge. The
district court held that recovery for those consequential damages
was not permitted by the Act.' 46 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the denial of damages for an employee's loss of income from a part-
time consulting practice because of a medical disability allegedly
caused by the employer's discrimination. 147
III. EQUITABLE RELIEF
Although the cases do not establish a clear procedure for deter-
mining equitable relief in an age discrimination case, they do sug-
gest that following a jury verdict for the plaintiff on liability, the
court should conduct a further hearing with respect to equitable re-
lief. That was the procedure followed by the district court in Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co. '48 and later expressly approved by the Eighth
Circuit. i49 Other circuits have utilized similar procedures and have
variously characterized the hearing on equitable relief after a jury
verdict on liability as a "bench trial on damages," 150 "post-trial mo-
tions ... for equitable relief,"' 5 1 "further proceedings" on dam-
ages, 152 or as "a separate trial for damages."' 153
In contrast to an award of back pay, which is mandatory under
146. Lyons v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
147. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 260-62 (5th Cir. 1985).
148. 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982).
149. Id. at 1100. See also Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279
(8th Cir. 1983) (case remanded because, among other things, "the district court denied
[plaintiff's] request for equitable relief without holding an additional hearing on the
equitable issues"); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 509 (W.D. Mo.
1978) (following a jury verdict a "plenary evidentiary hearing" on the equitable issues
was conducted before the court sitting without a jury), aft'd, 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.
1979).
150. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1981).
151. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
152. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
153. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
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the ADEA,' 54 the award of equitable relief is within the district
court's discretion. 55 However, the court may refuse to grant equi-
table relief only if its refusal is sufficiently justified.'5 6 In Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., for example, the Eighth Circuit held that
neither a "large damage award" nor an award of liquidated damages
was a sufficient basis for the denial of equitable relief.157 A court's
discretion in this regard is also limited, as a practical matter, by cer-
tain general assumptions. For example, "[i]n determining whether
to award equitable relief and, if so, what kind, a district court gener-
ally will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the illegally
discharged employee would have continued working for the em-
ployer until he or she reached normal retirement age."' 58 Although
in fashioning appropriate relief the court may resolve conflicts and
make findings,' 59 "it cannot base its decision on its own factual find-
ings that conflict with those expressly made by thejury."' 160 Absent
exceptional circumstances, the jury's verdict on the issue of age
discrimination is res judicata for purposes of awarding equitable
relief. 161
The types of equitable relief that courts have held to be appro-
priate to a prevailing plaintiff in an ADEA case include at least the
following: reinstatement, 162 front pay, 163 prejudgment interest, 64
154. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
155. Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1478 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied sub noma. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); Gibson v. Mo-
hawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) (award of pension benefits and damages in lieu of
reinstatement within discretion of district court).
156. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1983).
157. Id. at 280. But see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th
Cir.) (availability of a substantial liquidated damages award may be a proper considera-
tion in denying additional damages in lieu of reinstatement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982).
158. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1101 n.8 (8th Cir. 1982). Accord
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1984).
159. Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1985).
160. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 1982).
161. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 594
F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979)); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir.
1982) (also citing Cleverly); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
162. See infra notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 203-49 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
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compensation for loss of pension rights, 16 5 various forms of injunc-
tive relief, 166 and the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs. 167
A. Reinstatement
Among the remedies specifically set out in the Act is the court's
power to grant "judgments compelling employment, reinstatement
or promotion."'16 8 Reinstatement 69 is clearly an equitable rem-
edy. 1 70 Although reinstatement to a former position is not an abso-
lute right of a victim of age discrimination, it has been held to be the
"preferred remedy under the ADEA."' 7 ' The district court's refusal
to require the plaintiff's employment prompted the Eighth Circuit
in Dickerson 172 to remand with directions to enter an order compel-
ling the defendant to employ the plaintiff.'17  In Bum v. Western
165. See infra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 268-86 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 287-316 and accompanying text.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
169. "Reinstatement," as the term is used here, usually means reinstatement to the
position from which the plaintiff has been terminated. See, e.g., Stone v. Western Air
Lines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 33, 38 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("reinstatement" not an accurate
characterization of relief sought, since plaintiffs were terminated from positions as cap-
tains but sought reinstatement as second officers), aff'd sub nom. Criswell v. Western
Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985). In a more
general sense, it may also include reinstatement to a comparable position, see, e.g., Spa-
gnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860
(1981); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (plaintiff
ordered reinstated to his former position or to one "most comparable" thereto); promo-
tion to a position to which the plaintiff should have been promoted, but for age discrimi-
nation, Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 859-60 (4th Cir. 1985); DeFries v.
Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (C.D. Ill. 1980); or "promotion" to a position from
which the plaintiff has been demoted. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1478-
79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub non. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233
(1984). The Act also authorizes "employment," and the same principles apply to
"placement in ajob which [the employee] has been denied, rather than reinstatement to
ajob previously held." Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th
Cir. 1983).
170. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 860 (1981); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 143-44 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F.
Supp. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780,
788 (D. Md. 1978).
171. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub non.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984). See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l,
766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435,
1448 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985).
172. 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 279-81.
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Electric Co., the Tenth Circuit held that "courts should order rein-
statement under the ADEA whenever it is an appropriate
remedy."' 74
When is reinstatement the "appropriate remedy"? First of all, a
court need address the question of reinstatement only if the jury has
not foreclosed the issue in some fashion, as, for example, by finding
that the employee's employment contract was of limited duration, 175
or that the employee would have lost his or her job in any event for
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons such as the closing of a facil-
ity or a work force reduction. 76 Similarly, the employee's health
might preclude consideration of reinstatement. 17 7 In deciding
whether reinstatement is appropriate, courts have looked to
whether the previous position is unique, unusual, or sensitive,
171
such as that of a news anchorman at a television station;' 79 whether
it is a high level or executive position in the employer's organiza-
tion;1 0 or whether it is a temporary position or a permanent one.'81
A threshold determination, of course, is whether a position is avail-
able at the time of judgment to which the employee might be rein-
stated.' 8 2  Another important consideration is the degree of
animosity or antagonism that exists between employer and em-
ployee. "Reinstatement may not be appropriate ... when the em-
ployer has exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a practical
174. 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
175. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 945 (1981).
176. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982);
cf. Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (continued
reduction in work force sufficient evidence to conclude that reinstatement was not ap-
propriate; partial retroactive "reinstatement" ordered to qualify employee for pension
rights), aff'd, 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979).
177. See Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1985)
(federal employee totally disabled and unable to work, thus reinstatement not a
consideration).
178. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280-81 (8th Cir.
1983); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986).
179. Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 846-47 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
180. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1315, 1319 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
181. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
182. See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985); Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); cf. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119-22 (4th Cir. 1983).
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matter, a productive and amicable working relationship would be
impossible." 83 In addition, the Fourth Circuit has followed the gui-
dance of Title VII cases in holding that a reinstatement order
should not be implemented when it would require displacing an-
other person from the plaintiff's former job.184
Although the preferences of the parties may assist the court in
fashioning an appropriate reinstatement remedy, they are not
controlling.' 85 Thus, plaintiffs' statements that they would prefer
damages in lieu of reinstatement, 86 that reinstatement is inappro-
priate,187 and even that they would not accept reemployment if of-
fered,' 88 have not been viewed as sufficient justification for denial of
reinstatement. In Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,89 the Fourth Circuit
upheld the reinstatement of an ADEA plaintiff over the employer's
objections as to the plaintiff's "incompatability ... and his long ab-
sence from the trucking industry."' 90  Likewise, in Spagnuolo v.
Whirlpool Corp.,19 1 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
instatement order over vigorous objections by the employer that the
employee lacked the proper qualifications for a new position that
had been created by merging the employee's previous position with
another, and that "animosities and tensions between the parties
made reinstatement infeasible."'
192
183. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985). See also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796-97
(3d Cir. 1985) (reinstatement not feasible); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758
F.2d 1435, 1449 (1 th Cir.) (reinstatement appropriate), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525
(1985); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (rein-
statement impossible); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th
Cir. 1983) (employment ordered); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489
(4th Cir. 1982) (reinstatement appropriate); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672
F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (9th Cir.) (reinstatement not appropriate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir.) (reinstatement
appropriate), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500
F. Supp. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reinstatement not warranted under circumstances).
184. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119-22 (4th Cir. 1983).
185. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub non.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984). See also Goldstein v. Manhattan
Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985).
186. Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1478-79 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
187. Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985).
188. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627-28 (10th Cir. 1980).
189. 689 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1982).
190. Id. at 489.
191. 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
192. Id. at 1114-15.
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As illustrated by the history of the Spagnuolo case, which was
twice reviewed by the Fourth Circuit, '"9 implementing an order for
reinstatement can be difficult. In Spagnuolo, the district court had
ordered the plaintiff reinstated to a job comparable to his previous
one, and that order was affirmed on appeal.194 By the time the case
was before the Fourth Circuit on appeal for the second time, how-
ever, the employer had decided neither to place the plaintiff in the
newly created position that encompassed his old job nor to un-
couple the newly created combined position in order to give him
back his old job. The employer continued to delay offering him a
job and finally offered him three nonequivalent positions. One was
a position involving less supervisory responsibility and less stature,
less prospect for advancement, less overall compensation, and more
travel than the former job. The other two positions would have re-
quired that the plaintiff move to a distant city.'9 5 Upon review of
the district court's order either to uncouple the combined job or to
"bump" the person who had replaced the plaintiff in his former po-
sition, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the problem facing the dis-
trict court in trying to ensure compliance with its reinstatement
order, but remanded the case for further proceedings, 9 6 holding
that "the innocent unknowing beneficiary of the original discrimina-
tion" should not be "bumped."' 9 7 Instead, it gave the trial court
two options that could be pursued simultaneously. First, upon ap-
propriate motion, the district court could require that the employer
disclose which present positions it considered to be equivalent to
the employee's former position, whether anyone had been pro-
moted to any of those positions since the reinstatement order took
effect, and why certain other positions were not appropriate.19 8
Second, the district court could inquire into whether the employer
had taken measures to accommodate both the plaintiff and his re-
placement by offering the replacement comparable jobs in other lo-
cations.19 9 If the first inquiry revealed that the employer had since
filled a vacancy in a comparable job, the district court was then em-
powered to "bump" the person in that job on the presumption that
193. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860
(1981); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1983).
194. 641 F.2d at 1114-15.
195. 717 F.2d at 117.
196. Id. at 119-22.
197. Id. at 122.
198. Id. at 121-22.
199. Id. at 122.
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"the employee who is promoted or hired after the judicial pro-
nouncement of discrimination is no longer an innocent benefici-
ary."'20 0 No specific direction was given as to how the district court
should evaluate the employer's response to the second inquiry, but
the district court's contempt powers were noted.20 ' The court of
appeals reminded the district court that until its reinstatement order
could be implemented, "the original order must remain in effect,
with the back pay awards continuing until [the employer] finds an
appropriate vacancy. ' '202
B. Front Pay
For several years a hotly contested issue in ADEA cases has
been whether "front pay"-i.e., the recovery of future lost earn-
ings-is an available remedy under the Act if reinstatement is deter-
mined to be impracticable. The weight of authority now clearly
holds that it is. In 1985 the First and Third Circuits became the
seventh and eighth of the twelve circuit courts of appeals to hold
that front pay may be awarded as a remedy in lieu of reinstate-
ment.20 3 In doing so, those courts joined ranks with the Second Cir-
cuit,20 4  the Sixth Circuit, 205  the Eighth Circuit,20 6 the Ninth
Circuit, 2 7 the Tenth Circuit,20 8 and the Eleventh Circuit, 209 all of
200. Id.
201. "If [the employer] fails or refuses to demonstrate its efforts to comply with the
rightful place order, the district court, of course, may utilize its powers of contempt
against it." Id. at 122 n.4.
202. Id. at 122.
203. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 614-16 (1st Cir. 1985); Maxfield
v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-97 (3d Cir. 1985). In acknowledging that front pay is
a remedy available under the ADEA, the First Circuit stated in Wildman that it had
"never ruled squarely" on the issue, although it had "used language from which it could
be inferred that such damages would probably not be approved." 771 F.2d at 614.
Other courts, however, had read a footnote in the First Circuit's opinion in Kolb v.
Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982), as a holding disapproving front
pay recovery. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742
F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984). The First Circuit had earlier discussed the issue of front
pay, without deciding it, in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021-23 (1st Cir.
1979).
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of front pay directly for the first time in JIax-
field, 766 F.2d at 795-97, having previously reserved decision on that issue in Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980).
204. In Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726 (2d Cir. 1984), the
Second Circuit wrote its opinion "primarily to make clear, as a matter of precedent, our
approval of 'front pay' as a permissible remedy under the ADEA.".
205. Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984).
206. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
207. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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which had previously determined that front pay is a remedy avail-
able under the ADEA. In addition, the Fifth Circuit recently sug-
gested in dicta that it would likely approve front pay in a proper
case.
210
The earlier appellate opinions on front pay tended either to
avoid deciding the question,2 1' or to approve the principle of front
pay only in the abstract.21 2 More recently, however, as more district
courts have concluded that front pay is authorized by the Act, spe-
cific awards of front pay have been approved on appeal in cases in
which the issue has been presented squarely for decision.2 13
459 U.S. 859 (1982). In an earlier Ninth Circuit case an award of front pay was affirmed
on appeal without discussion. See Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 694, 700 (9th
Cir. 1981).
208. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
1984). This opinion, the Tenth Circuit's first opinion in the case, was withdrawn, 753
F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985), for further consideration after the Supreme Court had va-
cated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 896 (1985), in light of its decision in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985). The Tenth Circuit subsequently filed an
amended opinion, modified as to the willfulness issue in light of Thurston, but restating
its previous position on front pay, 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312
(1985). As a result, the Tenth Circuit adhered to its 1984 opinion that an award of front
pay is authorized by the ADEA in appropriate instances, but it remanded to the trial
court the question of whether front pay was more appropriate than reinstatement. 763
F.2d at 1171-73. The Tenth Circuit had considered the front pay issue in an earlier case
in which the district court had awarded front pay; in remanding that case, however, the
court declined to decide the availability of front pay as a remedy. Blim v. Western Elec.
Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1478-79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
209. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11 th Cir.
1984). See also Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985).
210. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 262 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985).
The court noted that it "need not decide the question whether a federal ADEA claimant
is entitled to back pay," because the tax-free disability compensation the plaintiff is re-
ceiving exceeds any possible front pay award to which he might be entitled. Id. The
court continued:
This question rarely arises because in most cases a prevailing plaintiff is rein-
stated and there is no need to award front pay. However, we note that, in a
case such as Smith's where the plaintiff is unable as a result of discrimination to
earn his livelihood, an award of front pay probably would be necessary to "ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act."
Id.
211. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021-23 (1st Cir. 1979); cf. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691,
694, 700 (9th Cir. 1981) (award of front pay affirmed without discussion).
212. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier
v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982).
213. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-97 (3d Cir. 1985); Whittlescv v.
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Courts approving front pay have concluded that front pay is au-
thorized by the Act's broad authorization to grant "such legal or
equitable relief" as is appropriate;' 1 4 that the remedy is a necessary
part of the equitable relief available to a district court under the
ADEA;2 15 that when reinstatement is inappropriate, front pay serves
the congressional intent of making whole victims of age discrimina-
tion by restoring them to the positions they would have been in had
the discrimination not occurred; 2 16 and that without an award of
reasonable offsetting compensation the discharged employee would
be irreparably harmed in the future.2 17 One court pointed out that
if front pay were not available as a remedy in lieu of reinstatement,
"an employer could avoid the purpose of the Act simply by making
reinstatement so unattractive and infeasible that the wronged em-
ployee would not want to return. 21 8 When there is no available
position to which an employee might be ordered reinstated, or
when the relationship between employer and employee has been so
damaged as to make reinstatement impracticable, courts have con-
cluded that the employee would be left without an adequate remedy
unless front pay could be granted."
Aside from questions that arise because the Act contains no
clear authorization for the award of front pay in lieu of reinstate-
ment,22 ° the principal objection to front pay has been that an award
Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984).
214. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pruden-
tial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
312 (1985); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984).
215. See, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985);
Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985);
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combus-
tion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984).
216. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985).
217. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984).
218. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985).
219. See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Man-
hattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525
(1985); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984). But see
Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 843. 846-47 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(employer objected to reinstatement and suggested award of front pay as appropriate
alternative; court denied reinstatement because of evidence of discord, antagonism, and
suspicion, but did not discuss or award front pay).
220. See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984);
Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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for future lost earnings is too speculative.22 ' The younger the em-
ployee seeking front pay damages in lieu of reinstatement, the
greater is the element of speculation in fashioning an appropriate
award. For example, plaintiffs in their forties have many years
before reaching age seventy in which they might or might not re-
ceive raises or salary reductions, change jobs, get fired, become in-
capacitated, or be subject to a nondiscriminatory reduction in
force.222 Conversely, the closer the plaintiffs are to age seventy, at
which they no longer fall within the Act's protected class, the less
speculative is a front pay award.223 Particularly in approving awards
of front pay to older employees, courts have rejected employers' ar-
guments that those awards are too speculative.224 Moreover, the
Third Circuit has observed that ADEA front pay awards are "no
more speculative than awards for lost earning capability routinely
made in personal injury and other types of cases" and added that
unjustified damage awards should be effectively controlled by the
plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages.225
Some courts have held that plaintiffs who fail to seek reinstate-
ment or who disclaim a desire for reinstatement thereby waive their
221. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979); Koyen v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (dicta). See also cases cited
infra note 237.
222. See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984)
("For example, the award of front pay to a discriminatorily discharged 41 year old em-
ployee until such time as he qualifies for a pension might be unwarranted."); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971); cf. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.,
742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984).
223. See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) ("On
the other hand, the failure to make such an award for an employee age 63, likewise
discriminatorily discharged, might be an abuse of discretion."); Whittlesey v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("at his age [68] the likelihood of re-employment is
minimal").
224. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985) (employee in late
60's); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (employee in
late 60's; "time period was relatively short"); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (employee one month past 68th birthday).
225. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984) (risk of uncertainty may exist in
awarding future damages but it is not "so great as to preclude automatically front pay in
every case"); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (future damages should be awarded in appropriate cases; the amount of the award
depends on a variety of factors, including the availability of alternate employment op-
portunities, employee's life expectancy, and present value tables).
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right to front pay damages in lieu of reinstatement. 226 The better
reasoning, however, holds that prospective damage awards should
not be so foreclosed, particularly if a climate of hostility in the work-
place would make reinstatement undesirable or unwarranted.227
When appropriate, an award of front pay is typically a lump
sum award calculated from the date of judgment to age seventy or
to normal retirement age,228 adjusted to reflect potential earnings in
mitigation of damages,22 9 and discounted to present value.23 ° Un-
like back pay,231 front pay is not mandatory, even though reinstate-
ment may be unavailable or inappropriate, but lies within the
district court's discretion.23 2 Therefore, "[b]ecause future damages
are often speculative, the district court, in exercising its discretion,
should consider the circumstances of the case, including the availa-
bility of liquidated damages. 23 3
Although front pay results in a monetary award, it is a form of
equitable rather than legal relief and should be determined by the
226. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1980); Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
227. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 n.2 (10th Cir.)
(citing Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (Title VII
case)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); see also Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560
F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("considering both the employee's or [sic] em-
ployer's interests").
228. See Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1982)
("[A] district court generally will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the ille-
gally discharged employee would have continued working for the employer until he or
she reached normal retirement age."); see, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742
F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th
Cir. 1984); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Koyen v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
229. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726 (2d Cir. 1984).
230. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 797 (3d Cir. 1985); Koyen v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
231. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
232. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985); Davis v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (award of front pay governed
by sound discretion of court and may not be appropriate in all cases, but failure to award
under proper .circumstances "might be an abuse of discretion").
233. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985). See also
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.) ("availability of a
substantial liquidated damages award may be a proper consideration in denying addi-
tional damages in lieu of reinstatement"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Loeb v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 n.35 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[W]here the value of
reinstatement is highly speculative, the availability of a substantial liquidated damages
award under the ADEA may be a proper consideration in denying additional damages in
lieu of reinstatement."). But see Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276.
280 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[L]iquidated damages are not intended to take the place of equita-
ble relief.").
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court rather than thejury.2 3 4 Because front pay is an alternative eq-
uitable remedy to reinstatement, the court will consider an award of
front pay or other monetary damages only if it concludes that rein-
statement is inappropriate.23 5
The Fourth Circuit has yet to rule squarely on the availability of
front pay as a remedy for an ADEA violation, 236 but the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland has addressed the
issue in several reported cases decided from 1977 to 1983. In each
instance the district judge held that front pay is not authorized by
the ADEA, despite the broad remedial language of the statute au-
thorizing "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate. 237
All of the Maryland District Court's subsequent decisions on front
pay have cited and relied on Judge Joseph H. Young's decision in
Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co. 2 38 In reaching his conclusion that front
234. The First Circuit noted that "damages in lieu of reinstatement, unlike payments
due as back wages ... , would constitute an equitable rather than a legal remedy." Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022 n.33 (1st Cir. 1979). See Taylor v. Home Ins. Co.,
777 F.2d 849, 859-60 (4th Cir. 1985) (district court's award of equitable relief included
front pay, coupled with order that employer offer employee two promotional opportuni-
ties when each became vacant; award affirmed on appeal). But see Maxfield v. Sinclair
Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court observed: "Of course the
amount of damages available as front pay is a jury question." No authority was cited for
that proposition in Maxfield. There was a bifurcated trial before ajury, the issue of liabil-
ity having been submitted first and resolved in the employee's favor. Then, apparently
before beginning the damages phase, the trial judge determined that "reinstatement
would clearly be an undesirable remedy." Id. at 797. Although the court's opinion is
not perfectly clear, the trial judge must then have decided to submit the front pay dam-
age issue to the jury, which had yet to consider other questions of damages. Id. at 790-
91, 796. Similarly, in Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 n.5 (6th Cir.
1984), the front pay question was submitted to the jury as a special issue, apparently to
give the trial judge a monetary alternative to reinstatement. The parties "had agreed
that the question of reinstatement should be reserved for decision by the Court." Id.
When the trial judge declined to reinstate the plaintiff, the jury's front pay award was
permitted to stand.
235. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia
Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1984); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022 (1st Cir. 1979). See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985).
236. In Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 859-60 (4th Cir. 1985), however, with
no discussion of front pay as an open issue, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decree that included front pay as an element of equitable relief.
237. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet, 33 Fair Empl,
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1261, 1266-67 (D. Md. 1983); MacGill v.Johns Hopkins Univ., 33 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1254, 1258-59 (D. Md. 1983); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp., 30
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, 92-93 (D. Md. 1982);Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co.,
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979); Mader v. Control Data Corp.,
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md. 1978); Covey v. Robert A.John-
ston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191-92 (D. Md. 1977).
238. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191-92 (D. Md. 1977).
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pay is not available under the Act, Judge Young relied heavily on
dicta in Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. ,2'9 noting in his opinion
that "existing law on the question is not extensive, but it is uni-
formly contrary to plaintiff's position. '"24' Writing in 1977, Judge
Young observed that "there is no authority supporting [front pay]
awards." 2
4 1
The line of Maryland District Court opinions rejecting front pay
is out of step with the developing trend of circuit court holdings to
the contrary. Six circuits addressed the issue in 1984 and 1985, all
after the most recent front pay decision of the Maryland District
Court, and each has expressly authorized front pay as an appropri-
ate remedy in lieu of reinstatement.242 Contrary to Judge Young's
observation in 1977, there is now substantial authority supporting
front pay awards.243
Language in the Fourth Circuit's 1982 decision in Cline v. Road-
way Express, Inc. 244 can be read to suggest a willingness to approve
front pay when the issue is presented. The court specifically ap-
proved the district court's "opting for reinstatement as an appropri-
ate remedy. ' 24 5  In so doing, however, the court seemed to
acknowledge that front pay was among "the broad equitable powers
conferred by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)" when it pointed to "the difficulties
of fashioning an appropriate monetary award if reinstatement were
not ordered. ' 24 6 And in its recent opinion in Taylor v. Home Insur-
ance Co. ,247 although the Fourth Circuit did not discuss front pay as
an issue, it affirmed the district court's decree that included front
239. 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
240. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1191.
241. Id. at 1192 (emphasis in original).
242. See supra notes 203-205 and 208-209.
243. The Monroe case relied upon by Judge Young was decided in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in 1971. Eleven years later that same
district court (in a case presided over by a different judge) awarded front pay to an
ADEA plaintiff. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 216-
19 (N.D. Ga. 1982, damages decided 1983). On appeal, although it remanded the case
for reconsideration of the effect of an offer of reinstatement, the Eleventh Circuit specifi-
cally approved front pay relief. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d
1543, 1550-52 (lith Cir. 1984).
244. 689 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1982).
245. Id. at 489.
246. Id. In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit noted that should the district court find
it necessary to revise the portion of its judgment relating to reinstatement, "it may then
consider granting substitute equitable relief'" Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d
1109, 1115 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
247. 777 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
1986] 337
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 45:298
pay as an element of equitable relief.248 Unless the Supreme Court
rules to the contrary, therefore, it seems likely that the Fourth Cir-
cuit, when the issue is presented for decision, will join the eight cir-
cuits that have so ruled and will support the applicability of front
pay awards in ADEA cases.249
C. Prejudgment Interest
As equitable relief, a court may grant a victorious ADEA plain-
tiff prejudgment interest pursuant to the FLSA remedies incorpo-
rated into the ADEA and the broad equitable powers conferred on
the courts by 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). 5 ° Most courts hold that the award
of prejudgment interest is within the trial court's discretion. 25'
An award of prejudgment interest has been held necessary to
make employees whole, at least in the absence of liquidated dam-
25ages, 52 by compensating them for the loss of use of money during
the period payments were withheld.253  Following the practice
under the FLSA, most courts do not allow prejudgment interest
when liquidated damages are awarded. 254 The Ninth Circuit, based
248. Id. at 859-60.
249. Judge Norman H. Ramsey opined to the contrary in 1983 in MacGill v. Johns
Hopkins Univ., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1254 (D. Md. 1983), albeit without the
benefit of seeing the trend develop during the last three years. He observed in that case
that "this Court concludes that were the issue presented to the Fourth Circuit, it would
hold that front pay is not recoverable in an action brought under the ADEA." Id. at
1259.
250. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th Cir. 1982); Kelly v. Amer-
ican Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 982-83 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Kolb v. Gold-
ring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 875 (1st Cir. 1982) (suggesting that plaintiffs are barred from
seeking prejudgment interest from the court if they had not requested it from the jury).
251. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11 th Cir.
1984); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th Cir. 1982); Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Heiar v. Crawford
County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1201-03 (7th Cir. 1984) (prejudgment interest not
awarded; case remanded because trial judge "has not yet adequately exercised his dis-
cretion"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 875
n.6 (1st Cir. 1982); cf. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 982 (9th Cir.
1981) (employee "should be compensated"; 6% rate applied in accordance with state
statute and agreement of parties).
252. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th Cir. 1982).
253. Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1981)), aff'd, 105 S. Ct.
2743 (1985).
254. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied sub nora.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694
F.2d 869, 875 (1st Cir. 1982); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th
Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109. 1114 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 860 (1981).
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upon its view that liquidated damages have a punitive purpose and
thus serve a function different from prejudgment interest, 25 5 per-
mits prejudgment interest even when liquidated damages are also
awarded.2 56 For the majority of courts, however, the make-whole
purpose of the Act is deemed to be satisfied by liquidated damages
doubling the plaintiff's back pay damages, and prejudgment interest
on the amount awarded as back pay is viewed as giving the plaintiff a
recovery in excess of that which the Act's purpose requires.
257
D. Pension Rights
Compensation for the loss of pension benefits resulting from
termination of an employee has been treated variously as legal dam-
ages or as equitable relief, and sometimes as both.2 58 The treat-
ment may depend upon the facts of the particular case.259 If the
issue involved is a monetary claim for lost pension benefits, in the
255. See supra note 129.
256. Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 547, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 981, 982-
83 (9th Cir. 1981) (approving trial court's award of prejudgment interest, remanding for
consideration of liquidated damages). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning has been criticized.
See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. deniedsub non. AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
257. An award of both prejudgment interest and liquidated damages has been charac-
terized as "double recovery." O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d
1543, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th
Cir. 1982). In Gibson, however, the Eighth Circuit suggested that "exceptional circum-
stances" might entitle the successful plaintiff to an award of both, id. at 1102, noting
particularly that prejudgment interest would be appropriate "if the liquidated damages
given are less than the interest that would have been due from the date the claim for
back pay accrued." Id. at 1102 n.9. See also Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d
1190, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[If thejudge can award less than double damages in a case
of willful violation .... he can award prejudgment interest as well in such a case, pro-
vided that the total award does not exceed double damages."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3500 (1985).
258. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
259. In Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 788-89 (D. Md. 1978), for
example, Judge Joseph H. Young was asked to rule on a motion to strike the plaintiff's
demand for jury trial. He had to determine, in the context of that case, which of the
plaintiff's claims were for legal damages and triable by a jury and which were for equita-
ble relief and thus to be determined by the court. In considering the plaintiff's claim for
restoration of pension rights, Judge Young distinguished Chilton v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F.
Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); and Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or.
1977), cases in which the plaintiff demanded monetary damages for lost benefits, includ-
ing pension benefits, and in which a pension claim was treated as legal damages. "The
plaintiff in this case requests the non-monetary and non-legal relief of restoration of his
pension status prior to his discharge, an equitable remedy for which he is not entitled to
a jury trial." 445 F. Supp. at 789.
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sense that claims for other lost fringe benefits are monetary claims,
then it may be treated as a legal claim triable to the jury.2 60 If the
claim is for restoration of pension rights or pension status, or for
adjustment of a pension plan, the claim is equitable in nature and
should be resolved by the court.26 ' The exact nature of the pension
claim and whether the claim is a jury issue are matters that ought to
be addressed as soon as possible after the case is at issue and re-
solved certainly no later than during the pretrial conference. Then,
to the extent that issues relating to pension rights are not decided
by the jury's award of back pay, the court should consider them dur-
ing the equitable phase of the case.
Most commonly, the court might order that a pension plan pay-
ment be made by the employer to raise the employee's "pension
interest to the level it would have reached absent discrimination. "262
The adjustment may be relatively simple and straightforward if the
terminated employee has not yet begun to receive benefits from the
employer's pension plan.263 Matters become more complicated,
260. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982);
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 1981); Fellows v. Medford
Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Or. 1977). See also Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Sales, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 962, 964-65 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (jury found liability but
court awarded damages, including lump sum for lost pension benefits), aff'd, 40 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (3d Cir. 1986); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141,
145 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (court determined damages after jury found liability; lost pension
benefits included in back pay award for purpose of calculating liquidated damages, but
posted to employees' pension plans rather than paid directly), rev'd on other grounds, 781
F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) (court, sitting without jury, awarded employee legal pension damages and
also ordered equitable pension relief).
261. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1449 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d
276, 279 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 n.15
(6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097, 1099 & n.5 (8th
Cir. 1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979); cf. Cleverly v.
Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1979) (claim for lost pension benefits
treated as equitable issue; trial court awarded "retroactive reinstatement" for approxi-
mately 18 months to permit vesting of employee's pension rights).
262. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979). See cases cited supra
note 66.
263. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1449 (11 th Cir.)
(affirming the district court's order of reinstatement, which directed the employer to
restore to the employee all pension benefits to which he would have been entitled if he
had not been terminated), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); Blackwell v. Sun Elec.
Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 n.15 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695
F.2d 1093, 1097, 1099 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F.
Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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however, if those benefits have begun being paid by the time the
case comes to trial. Then, the jury's back pay award may have to be
offset by the amount of benefits received,264 and the court might
also require that the plan be adjusted for the future.265 The equita-
ble adjustment might differ depending upon the type of plan, and
upon whether the court orders the employee reinstated 266 and
whether the employee's rights in the plan had vested at the time of
the discriminatory termination.26 7
E. Injunctive Relief
If appropriate, injunctive relief is available as an ADEA
264. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. See also Hagelthorn v. Kennecott
Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (district court properly offset that portion of
lump sum pension payment that represented difference between amount employee in
fact received at age 63 and lesser amount he would have received at age 65); Orzel v.
City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir.) (not abuse of discretion to
deduct retirement pension benefits), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). But see McDowell
v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1984) (improper for a court to per-
mit pension plan benefits to be deducted from an ADEA back pay award), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985).
265. See, e.g., Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1985); Gibson v.
Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1099 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg.
Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978); cf. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d
214, 215 (3d Cir. 1984) (pension plan adjusted, but by stipulation of the parties), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985).
266. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 945 (1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979); Cleverly v.
Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1979); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 141, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1986).
When the employee seeks reinstatement, an equitable remedy, it is "particularly appro-
priate" to characterize as an equitable issue the resolution of the employee's pension
and profit sharing benefit status as part of the reinstatement request. Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Quinn v.
Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 789 (D. Md. 1978)). If reinstatement is inap-
propriate and front pay relief is awarded, the court may have to consider pension rights
and benefits as part of the front pay award. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979).
267. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983) (employee not
entitled to pension benefits because not vested at time of discharge); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) (even though vesting requirements not met,
"some pension award may still be appropriate"; court observed that this is "a matter of
some technicality"). In cases in which the employee's pension rights were not vested at
the time of discharge, some courts have ordered payment into the plan sufficient to vest
the employee's pension, e.g., Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1099 n.5
(8th Cir. 1982); or have granted "retroactive reinstatement" from the date of discharge
until the date on which pension rights would have vested, e.g., Cleverly v. Western Elec.
Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979); Bishop
v. JelleffAssocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 594-96 (D.D.C. 1974).
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remedy. 268 Authority may be found in the Act's general statement
permitting a court to grant such "equitable relief as may be appro-
priate to effectuate" its purposes. 26 9 Although other types of equi-
table relief are occasionally characterized as "injunctive, "270 such as
when an employer is ordered to make payments of amounts owing
or to reinstate an employee, individual employees who sue to rem-
edy the termination of their employment because of age discrimina-
tion rarely seek injunctive relief in its stricter sense.27 1 Somewhat
more common are suits seeking "class-wide" injunctive relief,272 or
suits brought by the Secretary of Labor (now the EEOC) 273 seeking,
268. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 859 (1982).
269. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See, e.g., Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
554 F.2d 730, 731-32 n.l (5th Cir. 1977) ("ADEA § 7(b), 29 U.S.C § 626(b), incorpo-
rates by reference the civil enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act al-
lowing the Secretary [of Labor] to seek injunctions and to recover lost wages on behalf
of wronged employees."); Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760,
764 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 794 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985)
(comparing noninjunctive FLSA provisions with analogous ADEA provisions that do al-
low injunctive relief).
270. See, e.g., Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(injunction issued to compel payment of back pay, pension benefits, and prejudgment
interest), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, modified mem., 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Buchholz
v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713, 714 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (employer enjoined to
provide employee future pension benefits); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F.
Supp. 655, 665 (W.D. Va. 1977) (injunction issued to compel reinstatement "with all
benefits, seniority, and job status which would have accrued had the discharges never
occurred" and "to place the plaintiffs on an accelerated training schedule").
271. In one such case, Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982), the three plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to enjoin fu-
ture violations by their former employer. The trial judge found that the substantial
judgment against the employer was sufficient to discourage it from practicing age dis-
crimination in the future. The court of appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in denying the injunction. Id. at 1320. In another case the plaintiff sought
an injunction to prevent further discriminatory acts against him by the employer. Hav-
ing denied reinstatement, however, the court denied injunctive relief as moot. Combes
v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Okla. 1976). In Taylor v. Home
Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 859 (4th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff sought to enjoin his employer
"from engaging in unlawful practices and from continuing other unlawful practices
against him." The appellate court never mentioned whether any such injunction was
included in the district court's award of equitable relief, which it affirmed. Id. at 859-60.
272. See, e.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 558 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that "the same standards for class-wide relief should be applied in ADEA cases
as are applicable under Title VII"), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985); Rodriguez v. Taylor,
569 F.2d 1231, 1235 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Marshall v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733-35 (5th Cir. 1977).
273. On July 1, 1979, the enforcement responsibilities originally given by the ADEA
to the Secretary of Labor were transferred to the EEOC by § 2 of the Reorg. Plan No. I
of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). See EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d
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among other things, to enjoin future violations of the ADEA.2 7 4
A preliminary injunction may issue to preserve the status quo
and to prohibit threatened or existing violations of the ADEA if the
plaintiff can show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, if in the
absence of such an injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable
injury, and if the potential harm to the plaintiff outweighs that which
would befall the defendant were the injunction to be granted.27 5
Permanent injunctive relief granted under the ADEA has varied
in character from broad prohibitions against continued unlawful pri-
vate conduct to at least one instance in which a federal court has
enjoined the enforcement of a discriminatory state statute. In gen-
eral, however, the availability of injunctive relief in a particular case
will depend upon the nature of the violation, the extent of the re-
sulting injury, and the availability of other remedies. For example,
in Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,276 a case in which
the evidence disclosed a discriminatory hiring policy on the part of
the employer, the Fifth Circuit held inadequate a district court's in-
junction prohibiting future violations of the Act only with respect to
the hiring of bank tellers and ordered the injunction broadened to
600, 603 (10th Cir. 1980); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236,
242 n.10 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
274. See, e.g., Marshall v. Airpax Elecs., Inc., 595 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1979); Hodgson
v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760, 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820-21, 825-27 (5th Cir. 1972).
275. Compare Farkas v. New York State Dep't of Health, 554 F. Supp. 24 (N.D.N.Y.
1982) (preliminary injunction granted because of showing of irreparable injury and
prima facie showing of discriminatory treatment), aff'd men., 767 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1985)
and Cannistra v. FAA, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1621, 1622-24 (D.D.C. 1979)
(preliminary injunction granted to employees who showed that age-related transfer of
their divisions while awaiting trial would result in irreparable economic harm, while em-
ployer did not show that it would be injured if transfer were blocked) uith EEOC v. City
ofJanesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1257-59 (7th Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction reversed as
abuse of discretion; court of appeals concluded plaintiff not likely to prevail on merits
and irreparable injury not shown); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 F. Supp.
1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (preliminary injunction denied because no showing of irrep-
arable injury, there being no proof that other employment was not available to plaintiff),
aff'd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Stone v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 33
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (although preliminary injunction granted as to one plaintiff, a second
officer, it was denied as to eight captains because requested relief exceeded injury and
balance of hardship did not tip in their favor), affd sub nom. Criswell v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985) and EEOC v. City of
Cleveland Heights, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 367 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (upon show-
ing of critical manpower shortage, court refused to restrain city from giving police entry
examination, even though it had been improperly advertised to exclude persons pro-
tected by ADEA).
276. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
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cover all categories of jobs.211 In such a situation, "courts should
not be loathe to issue injunctions of general applicability. ' 278 The
Fourth Circuit took similar measures in Hodgson v. Approved Personnel
Service, Inc.,279 when it held that the district court should have
granted broad injunctive relief against an employment agency that
had advertised in violation of the Act, in light of the agency's re-
peated violations, its repeated failure to fulfill promises of compli-
ance, and its refusal to discontinue use of the prohibited
advertisements until after suit had been filed.28 Likewise, in Criswell
v. Western Airlines, Inc. ,28 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's
''system-wide injunctive relief'" based upon a finding that "clear and
willful violations" of the ADEA had resulted from the defendant
company's policy. 282 And in EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement System,
2 8 3
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of a district court that in-
cluded a permanent injunction preventing the State of Wyoming
from enforcing a statute that discriminated against protected indi-
viduals on the basis of age. 84
Unless a pattern or practice of ADEA violations has been
shown, however, it is unlikely that broad injunctive relief will be ap-
propriate. For example, the Fifth Circuit ordered a company-wide
injunction modified on remand in Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. 285 because the violation had been committed by only one store
manager and had not resulted from a discriminatory company
policy.2 8
6
F. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
The ADEA has incorporated by reference section 16(b) of the
FLSA, which provides, in part, that "[the court in such action shall,
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
277. Id. at 825-27.
278. Id. at 826. The court noted that "an injunction in this type of case is not a bur-
densome thing; it simply requires the employer to obey the law." Id.
279. 529 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1975).
280. Id. at 762-64.
281. 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
282. Id. at 558.
283. 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
284. Id. at 1427-28, 1432.
285. 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
286. Id. at 735. The court observed that "injunctive relief is a drastic remedy, not to
be applied as a matter of course." Id. at 733. See also Marshall v. Airpax Elecs., Inc., 595
F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court's determination that injunctive
relief was not needed when only two ADEA violations had been disclosed).
[VOL. 45:298344
REMEDIES UNDER THE ADEA
costs of the action." '87 This language has been interpreted as mak-
ing mandatory an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff who
prevails at trial, " 8 even if that plaintiff is represented by a publicly
funded legal services organization. 289 The amount of fees awarded,
however, is subject to the trial court's discretion.290
Rarely does a trial court refuse to award attorneys' fees. 2 9 ' Is-
sues frequently arise, however, with respect to the criteria to be em-
ployed in arriving at an award of fees, 92 claims of excessiveness or
287. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (incorporated by reference in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1982)). See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543,
1552 (11th Cir. 1984); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1983);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th
Cir. 1974); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 n.47 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977).
288. Hagethorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1983) (award is
"mandatory"; court has "no discretion to deny"); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g
Co., 550 F.2d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Ginsberg v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff "entitled");
Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977) (plaintiffs
"entitled"); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (plain-
tiff "entitled").
289. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978).
290. Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1983); Syvock v. Mil-
waukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1247 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Ginsberg v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
291. In one such case, the trial court denied attorneys' fees, concluding, erroneously,
that the decision whether to award any fee at all was within its discretion. The Second
Circuit remanded for determination of a reasonable fee. Hagelthorn v. Kennecott
Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983).
292. Courts have considered such matters as the results obtained, see, e.g., Frith v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 950, 951 (4th Cir. 1979); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co.,
594 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1979); the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed, see, e.g.,
Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 162-65 (7th Cir. 1981); the appro-
priateness of an hourly rate, see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1247-50 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); whether the time spent was reasonably and
necessarily required, see, e.g., Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161,
1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that "one may not indulge in the luxurious practice of law
at the expense of the other side"); whether fees may be awarded in accordance with, or
in excess of, the fee agreement between the plaintiff and his or her attorneys, see, e.g.,
Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 642, 643 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that court
is not bound to limit award to amount provided in contingent fee arrangement, particu-
larly when considering value of pension rights granted in addition to amount of jury's
award); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that it was appropriate to award fees in accordance with the agreement); and
the appropriateness of an upward adjustment of the "lodestar" amount-i.e., the figure
determined by multiplying the reasonable number of hours by a reasonable hourly
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inadequacy of fees,293 and even the timeliness of the application for
fees. 2
9 4
Attorneys' fees may also be awarded for legal services rendered
to a prevailing plaintiff on appeal. ' 5 In contrast to attorneys' fees
at trial, to which the prevailing plaintiff is entitled, an award of attor-
neys' fees on appeal is said to be discretionary.296 Such awards may
rate-to reflect such factors as contingent-fee risk, difficulty of issues, quality of repre-
sentation, etc., see, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 609-14 (1st Cir.
1985) (remanding for reconsideration of upward adjustment); Davis v. Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1984) (remanding for reconsideration of
upward adjustment, but disallowing additional fees for contingency factor and quality of
representation); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming
trial court's refusal to augment the lodestar by a multiplier).
When the result on appeal is modified, thus changing the premises on which the
district court originally awarded fees, the district court will generally be invited on re-
mand to reexamine its award of fees. See, e.g., Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473,
1480 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 105 S. Ct. 233
(1984); Frith v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 950, 951 (4th Cir. 1979); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978).
293. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 162-65 (7th Cir.
1981) (district court's reduction in number of compensable hours too great; case re-
manded for increased fees); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th
Cir.) (fees proper, not excessive), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Cleverly v. Western
Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1979) (fees not excessive, district court's com-
putation "a model of clarity"); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1247-50 (3d Cir.
1977) (case remanded for recalculation of increased attorneys' fee award based on rea-
sonable hourly rate), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
294. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1552
(11 th Cir. 1984); cf. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 694-95 (8th
Cir. 1983).
295. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1553
(11 th Cir. 1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d
974, 986 (9th Cir. 1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 642-43 (8th
Cir. 1979); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1250 n.34 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
296. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1553
(1 th Cir. 1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 986
(9th Cir. 1981); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 1979).
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reflect successful defense of the trial verdict, 29 7 successful prosecu-
tion of the appeal,298 or the mastery of complex issues on appeal.299
The appellate court may make its own assessment of the amount of
fees to be awarded on appeal.3 ° ° More commonly, however, the dis-
trict court is instructed on remand to determine and award a reason-
able fee for appellate legal services.3 ° '
Questions have occasionally arisen as to whether an ADEA
plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for legal services
performed at the administrative level. In 1981, in New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey,"°2 the Supreme Court decided that Title VII au-
thorized an award of attorneys' fees for work done on behalf of the
prevailing complainant in state administrative proceedings.30 3 In
Kennedy v. Whitehurst,3°4 however, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that a federal employee 30 5 who
secures relief solely through administrative processes is not entitled
297. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 859 (1982). See also Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th
Cir), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). The plaintiff need not be successful in defending
every issue on appeal. The fee should reflect plaintiff's entitlement to a fee "for the case
as a whole." Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1979).
298. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 1981); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
299. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 1981).
300. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1979); cf.
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(court recognized that it could award appellate fees; it elected, instead, to instruct dis-
trict court on remand to do so).
301. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11 th Cir.
1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 859 (1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 986 (9th
Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1250 n.34 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
302. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
303. Id. at 71.
304. 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
305. Federal employees were first covered by the ADEA in 1974, when the Act was
amended by the addition of § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982). Lehman v. Nakshian, 453
U.S. 156, 157 (1981); Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 261 (5th
Cir. 1985). Section 15 was amended in 1978 by the addition of subsection (f) to make
clear that the federal employee enforcement provisions of § 15 were "self-contained and
unaffected by other sections" of the ADEA, including those pertaining to private em-
ployees. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167-68 (198 1); Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690
F.2d 951, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1982). As a result, there are differences in procedures and in
the remedies available to federal employees and private employees. For instance, trial
by jury of legal issues, available under the ADEA to private employees, is not available to
a federal employee. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). And liquidated dam-
ages, available to private employees, may not be recovered from the government by a
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to an award of attorneys' fees and costs under ADEA. °6 In reach-
ing that result, the court relied upon "the vague authorizing lan-
guage" of section 15(c) of the ADEA, 3°7 "the more circumscribed
role of administrative proceedings under the ADEA enforcement
scheme, ' ',3 8 and distinctions between the statutory language of Title
VII and that of the ADEA. °9 By contrast, district courts have
reached differing decisions on whether a private employee is enti-
tled to attorneys' fees for representation before the EEOC or a state
administrative agency.310
In addition to attorneys' fees, costs of suit may be awarded to
successful ADEA plaintiffs.3 1 ' However, despite occasional efforts
to expand the scope of costs to include all "out-of-pocket ex-
penses," courts have limited recoverable costs to those permitted by
28 U.S.C. § 1920,312 the federal statute generally governing the
federal employee. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258, 263 (5th
Cir. 1985).
306. Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Despite some differ-
ences between the enforcement provisions pertaining to federal and private employees,
a prevailing federal ADEA plaintiff has been held entitled under § 15(c) of the ADEA to
an award of attorneys' fees and costs for successful litigation services on the ground that
such an award "effectuates the purposes" of the ADEA. DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F.
Supp. 1037, 1044-45 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
307. 690 F.2d at 962, 965.
308. Id. at 965. The court pointed out that Title VII complainants must exhaust cer-
tain administrative remedies as a precondition to filing an action in federal court. For
ADEA complainants, by contrast, pursuit of administrative remedies is optional and not
a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit. Id. at 964. The court concluded, therefore, that
administrative proceedings under the ADEA are not a "pervasive and integral part of
the overall scheme of enforcement," and, thus, because they are optional, could not
"effectuate the purposes" of the ADEA in any significant way, as required for relief to be
granted under § 15(c), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1982). Id. at 962, 964 (quoting Kennedy v.
Whitehurst, 509 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.D.C. 1981)).
309. Id. at 957, 962, 965. The court observed that "while Title VII permits fee awards
in any 'action or proceeding,' the FLSA language contained in the ADEA authorizes
awards only to a 'plaintiff or plaintiffs' who secure a 'judgment' in an 'action.'" Id. at
957. In a note the court invited comparison of § 706(k) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k) (1982)) with § 16(b) of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)). Id. at 957 n.12.
310. Compare Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1170-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (services rendered before the EEOC not compensable under the
ADEA) with Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 242-44 (S.D.
Ga. 1982) (ADEA authorizes award of attorneys' fees for legal services at the state ad-
ministrative level).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982), incorporated by reference into the ADEA by 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982), provides iii pertinent part that the court shall, "in addition to
any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to
be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
312. The statute provides:
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recovery of costs. 3 13
Because of the FLSA language incorporated by reference into
the ADEA, 1 4 courts have held that the ADEA does not authorize
the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants.31 5 Even so,
costs have been awarded to a defendant as the prevailing party 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the discussion above, the proper procedure when a
jury trial is prayed in ADEA cases is as follows:
A. Liability, Back Pay, Willfulness
The issue of liability and the question of damages for back pay
and lost benefits should be tried to the jury. If the jury determines
that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of his or her age,
it should award an appropriate amount of damages for back pay and
lost benefits, less deductions for interim earnings and other proper
set offs, from the date of the discriminatory act through trial, unless
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic tran-
script necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpret-
ers, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services
under section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982).
313. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1012, 1021-22 & n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(plaintiff's attorney argued that "costs" is not so limited, but conceded that "he could
find no authority for his position"), aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980). The cost of
computer-aided legal research, denied by the trial court in 11'ehr, was deemed recover-
able, if reasonable, by the Third Circuit. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 285
(3d Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, reversed the inclusion of such an
item in a district judge's award of costs, calling it a "component of attorneys' fees," as is
other legal research. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 695 (8th
Cir. 1983).
314. See supra note 311.
315. Mizrany v. Texas Rehabilitation Comm'n, 522 F. Stipp. 611, 618 (S.D. Tex.
1981), aff'd mem., 685 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1982).
316. Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) (pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)).
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the jury finds from the evidence that the defendant's liability should
end at an earlier date.
Thus, for example, if the jury determines from the evidence
that the plaintiff's employment would have been terminated before
the date of trial for a nondiscriminatory reason, then it may calculate
back pay only through that earlier date. Similarly, if the jury deter-
mines from the evidence that the plaintiff rejected a bona fide offer
of reinstatement, then it may calculate back pay only through the
date upon which the offer was made. Such issues are best presented
to the jury by special interrogatory.
As part of the back pay damages, the jury should consider any
raises or bonuses that the plaintiff might reasonably have antici-
pated, and it should include other adequately proven lost monetary
benefits. In addition, the jury should consider any issues relating to
the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages, and, to the extent that it
finds that the defendant has carried its burden of showing that the
plaintiff failed to mitigate, it may reduce the back pay award
accordingly.
If there are facts that justify the finding, the jury should also
determine whether the defendant's conduct was willful. This issue
should be submitted to the jury by special interrogatory to enable
the court to assess liquidated damages as part of the plaintiff's over-
all relief.
B. Equitable Relief
If the jury decides for the plaintiff on liability, the court should
conduct a subsequent hearing to determine equitable relief.
If the jury finds by special interrogatory that the defendant's
conduct was willful, the court should assess the additional equal
amount in liquidated damages, thereby doubling the damages
award. If the jury does not find the defendant's conduct to have
been willful, the court should consider assessing prejudgment inter-
est on the jury's award of damages.
Unless the issue is foreclosed by the jury's verdict, " 7 the court
should consider whether reinstatement of the plaintiff to the same
or a substantially similarjob is appropriate. If the court grants rein-
statement, provisions should be made to adjust the plaintiff's pen-
sion rights accordingly.
If reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy, the court should
317. For example, a finding that the plaintiff would have been terminated before trial
for a nondiscriminatory reason effectively forecloses the reinstatement issue.
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determine and award monetary damages in lieu of reinstatement as
front pay in order to compensate for lost wages from the date of
trial through the date on which the plaintiff might have been ex-
pected to retire and to compensate for the pension benefits that the
plaintiff will have lost by not having been permitted to work until
retirement.
Finally, after judgment is entered, if the plaintiff prevails, the
court must award costs and a reasonable amount as attorneys' fees.
